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## THE FACTIONS WITHIN THE RAGUSAN PATRICIATE (17th-18th Century)

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**ABSTRACT:** Banished after an alleged love scandal in 1609, Jakov Giorgi and Jakov Resti conspired with Charles Emmanuel I, duke of Savoy, against the Ottomans. Shortly after their arrest in Dubrovnik in September 1612, they were put under trial. Widely supported by the kin, the conspirators won a political victory over the pragmatic faction of the "Republican loyalists". A strong agnatic and political network grouped around the core of the conspirators, and formed a faction called *salamankezi* (the Salamancanists). This group became fully articulated in the 17th century, after the aggregation of the new nobility, and it was to play a dominant role on the Ragusan political scene over the next century-and-a-half. The inferior position was reserved for the so-called *sorbonezi* (the Sorbonnists), who eventually coalesced with the disdained new nobility. Animosity between the two closed groups continued well into the 18th century and their unscrupulous struggle for political power reshaped the traditional pattern of Ragusan political behaviour.

### *1. Distinctive class features of the Ragusan patriciate*

Ragusan patriciate, an urban trade aristocracy, which emerged in the 12th century, played the leading role in creating the social and political framework

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of the Ragusan commune in the Middle Ages.<sup>1</sup> The first half of the 14th century saw the closing of the patrician circle (formally achieved in 1322), in the context of the strengthening of the commune's political independence, its territorial expansion, and governmental consolidation. Old communal institutions were subject to transformation with the objective to secure the dominant position of this noble stratum, and to give the institutional system an aristocratic pattern. The political sovereignty, attended in 1358, completed this process, while specific historical circumstances have to be credited for the centuries-long experience of this class in ruling the state. The genuine ideology of the Ragusan state evolved under the influence of the humanist and renaissance thought, and as such had direct impact on the defining of the political identity of the Ragusan patriciate as a ruling elite. A myriad of ancient legends and traditions pertaining to Epidaurum, a nearby settlement dating from antiquity, served as a historical, legal, and symbolic justification of their legitimate social position. The rise of the Ragusan patriciate remained an uncommon phenomenon in the eastern-Adriatic context because the nobility of other Dalmatian cities under Venetian domination started losing their political prerogatives.

In its class ambition to rule, Ragusan patriciate restricted access to all offices related to decision-making and governing. The organization, jurisdiction, and functioning of the institutional apparatus, councils and offices developed and adjusted to suit a specific model of aristocratic republicanism (*universitas*, corporation), which proved successful in foreign policy and particularly in the long-standing efforts to maintain internal social stability. Equality before the law, membership in the Major Council, duty to fulfill

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<sup>1</sup> A comparison between the social role of the patriciate in medieval Dubrovnik and that of the Italian city-states of Venice, Genoa, Lucca, or Florence points to a number of similarities in aristocratic organization. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the differences gained in prominence. In view of the processes of social differentiation, which in the Italian cities shifted the focus of social attention away from the nobility, the Ragusan political model did not experience any radical changes, remaining petrified in its medieval framework until the very last days of the Republic. Apart from the specific geo-political position, the stability of the aristocratic rule owed much to the small size of the Republic's territory and its population. Despite unavoidable conflicts which are the subject of this study, the Ragusan patriciate proved capable of maintaining its class solidarity, controlling and directing the political processes. On the crisis of the nobility of the Italian cities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see Claudio Donati, »The Italian Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries«, in: H. M. Scott (ed.), *The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, I. London and New York: Longman, 1995: pp. 237-268.

offices, hereditary rights through legitimate male offspring, and legalized endogamy were the hallmarks of the Ragusan nobility.<sup>2</sup> Rigid class exclusivism, upon which the patriciate's solidarity and homogeneity were based, represented an essential element in maintaining the current social hierarchy, and subsequently generated a number of problems which resulted in political instability in the 17th and 18th centuries. But despite the fact, this formal institutional frame, with minor adjustments, managed to survive until the fall of the Republic in 1808.<sup>3</sup>

## 2. *The roots of the rift*

Given the role of the patriciate in governing the state, it may rightly be assumed that the Ragusan policy owed much of its success to class cohesion and the consensus of the patricians on major political issues. All the political disagreements and open conflicts which occasionally undermined the noble elite during the 15th and 16th centuries were resolved within the traditional pattern of decision-making.<sup>4</sup> By the 17th century the patriciate's unity had not been seriously threatened, and the decision-making on the councils exhibited a high degree of consensus.

According to traditional historiography, at the root of the split of the Ragusan patriciate in the 17th century lay a discriminatory bloodline division

<sup>2</sup> The strict endogamous principle was introduced by the law of 1462. *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 12, f. 60v (State Archives of Dubrovnik).

<sup>3</sup> On the Ragusan patriciate during the Middle Ages see: Konstantin Jireček, *Die Romanen in der Städten Dalmatiens während des Mittelalters*. Wien, 1901; Irmgard Mahnken, *Dubrovački patricijat u XIV veku*. [Posebna izdanja Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti, 340]. Beograd: SANU, 1960; Josip Lučić, »O dubrovačkom patricijatu u XIV stoljeću«. *Historijski zbornik* 17 (1964): pp. 393-411; Bariša Krekić, »Developed Autonomy: The Patricians in Dubrovnik and Dalmatian Cities«, in: idem, *Urban Society of Eastern Europe in Premodern Times*. Los Angeles, Berkley: University of California Press, 1978: pp. 185-215; Bariša Krekić, »O problemu koncentracije vlasti u Dubrovniku u XIV i XV vijeku«. *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta* 24-25 (1986): pp. 397-406; Zdenka Janeković-Römer, *Okvir slobode: Dubrovačka vlastela između srednjovjekovlja i humanizma*. Zagreb-Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU, 1999.

<sup>4</sup> Political collaboration of certain Ragusan nobles with foreign rulers had always been a threat and a challenge to the patriciate's unity. The well-known conspiracy of the Bucignolo brothers from 1532, as well as the intelligence activity of Marin Zamagna (1480-1548) and Frano Luccari (1541-1598) on behalf of the Habsburgs of Austria and Spain proved a trifle in comparison with the political split caused by the stirring events of the Great Conspiracy. Cf. Josip Žontar, *Obveščevalna služba in diplomacija austrijskih Habsburžanov v boju proti Turkom v 16. stoletju*. Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti, 1973: pp. 13-46, 57-95, 103-107; Jorjo Tadić, *Dubrovački portreti*. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1948: pp. 9-52; 281-315.

among the patricians, which developed after the ennoblement of ten wealthy merchant families. The criterion which at that time largely determined the shaping of the two rival agnatic groups was closely connected to their attitude towards the new nobility. Some noble families (or *casate* of certain families) refused any form of amalgamation with the recently ennobled families, while the others found no obstacle to establish marital or affinal ties with the aggregates. The consequences of this agnatically based conflict had become increasingly visible in the mid-18th century, when it became more than apparent that the traditional mechanism of decision-making on the councils no longer functioned. The inner-class consensualism gave way to an open conflict between the two rival groups. The agnatic division marked the political behaviour, perpetuating the crisis of the patriciate. The old nobility stubbornly refused to acknowledge marriage ties with the new nobles, holding the latter inferior in rank, while a number of patrician houses accepted the new nobles and amalgamated with them. The sources from the 1760s refer to the first group as *salamankezi* (the Salamancanists), and to the opposed group as *sorbonezi* (the Sorbonnists).<sup>5</sup>

The “blood” rift was, however, only a biological frame of the political conflict which dated back about 50 years before the period of aggregation. Admittedly, the patrician solidarity was subject to irreparable instability by the beginning of the 17th century. This period of intense political ferment marked a turning-point in the relations between the patrician families, and with it, in the entire political practice. The conflict reached a climax in 1611/12 with an event known in historiography as the Great Conspiracy.<sup>6</sup> A

<sup>5</sup> A most thorough analysis of the patrician rift after the aggregation and the emergence of the factions of the Sorbonnists and the Salamancanists has been provided by Žarko Muljačić. See his works: »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«. *Anali Historijskog instituta JAZU u Dubrovniku* 6-7 (1959): pp. 25-40; »Salamankezi i sorbonezi u Dubrovniku«. *Filologija* 2 (1959): pp. 161-173; »Istraga protiv jakobinaca 1797. god. u Dubrovniku«. *Anali Historijskog instituta JAZU u Dubrovniku* 2 (1953): pp. 235-252.

<sup>6</sup> The study of the Great Conspiracy in this article is based on the published sources and the extensive literature available. Relevant Ragusan documents pertaining to the events involving the plot have been edited in: *Dubrovačka akta i povelje*, III.1, ed. Jovan Radonić. [Zbornik za istoriju, jezik i književnost srpskog naroda, IX]. Beograd: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1939: pp. 182-321. Venetian documents on the issue are edited by Šime Ljubić, »O odnošajih medju republikom Mletačkom i Dubrovačkom od početka XVI. stoljeća do njihove propasti« *Rad JAZU* 53 (1880): pp. 137-151. For the conspiracy, see the following pivotal works: Dragoljub Pavlović, »Stijepo Đorđić (Đurđević)«, in: idem, *Iz književne i kulturne istorije Dubrovnika*. Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1955: pp. 60-68; Radovan Samardžić, *Veliki vek Dubrovnika*. Beograd: Prosveta, 1983: pp. 44-61; Vinko Foretić, *Povijest Dubrovnika*, II. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1980:

crisis which practically paralyzed the complete institutional apparatus was caused by a group of nobles who were set on involving the Republic in war campaigns by the counter-Ottoman coalition to restore European territories occupied by the Ottoman Empire. The Great Conspiracy may be viewed as reverberations of the European political concept of orientalism, with the eastern policy as the main issue.<sup>7</sup> The dawn of the 17th century saw the first Ottoman defeats, giving rise to a host of political plans by the counter-Ottoman coalition, which were to determine permanently the relations between the Western Christendom and the weakened East. However, the coalition of the interested states and rulers proved provisional and they failed to establish stable political relations. The Habsburgs of Spain and Austria, Pope Clement VIII, the Spanish governors of Naples and their Italian minions featured as leading actors in all the phases of the expansionist campaign. The movement was profoundly imbued with the ideas of the Catholic Counter-Reformation. In view of the Slavs under the Ottoman rule, it was particularly marked with the papal policy and the influence of the Jesuit order.

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pp. 74-78. Despite substantial factual information, older authors failed to discern the political and class repercussions of the Conspiracy. In this respect Zdenko Zlatar has made a much-needed contribution. See: Zdenko Zlatar, *Our Kingdom Come: The Counter-Reformation, The Republic of Dubrovnik, and the Liberation of the Balkan Slavs*. New York: Boulder, Columbia University Press, 1992; Zdenko Zlatar, *Between the Double Eagle and the Crescent. The Republic of Dubrovnik and the Origins of the Eastern Question*. New York: Boulder, Columbia University Press, 1992. Viewing the Conspiracy as a political turning-point, Zlatar tended to analyze its international political dimension. Founding his interpretation on the conflict between a "pro-Ottoman" and a "counter-Ottoman" faction, he overaccentuated the influence of the broader Counter-Reformation context, the Vatican policy, and the impact of the European Catholic states on the political affairs amongst the Ragusan patriciate. Having taken into consideration Zlatar's results, we have here examined the Conspiracy as an embryo of the patrician conflict. We have supported it with an analysis of the agnatically based political structure of the patriciate. In this respect, a specific agnatic and political dynamics developed after the Conspiracy, which most directly influenced the deepening and the continuity of the rift.

<sup>7</sup> In conformity with anthropological assumptions of William Said on the understanding of the eastern, primarily Ottoman civilization from the western standpoint, this period is of particular importance. It was then that an all-embracing ideological vision of the Orient as a profoundly different and hostile religion and civilization became widespread throughout Europe. Historically, western orientalism represents an interrelationship in which the Christian West "defined" the East. On the other hand, western perspective was determined by a self-reflective construction of its own civilization. Thus, in modern history western orientalism played an essential role in defining the idea of Europe and its identity. Cf. William Said, *Orientalizam*. Zagreb: Konzor, 2000.

### 3. *The Great Conspiracy*

With the end of the long, drawn-out war between the Habsburgs and the Turks (1593-1606), Spain and Austria temporarily restrained from further actions, and the newly ordained pope, Paul V, failed to resume the policy of his predecessor. Duke Charles Emmanuel I of Savoy was the leading figure of the counter-Ottoman campaign in Spain. In the course of 1607 he intensified the intelligence activity, the aim of which was to launch an invasion on the eastern Adriatic coast from where the *reconquista* was to spread towards the Balkan mainland. It is quite understandable that Charles Emmanuel I included the territory of the Republic into his strategic schemes. The ports of Dubrovnik and Mali Ston were to serve as bridgeheads and logistic bases for the supply of the rebels.<sup>8</sup>

True, the political atmosphere in Dubrovnik may have seemed predisposed towards the realization of the aforementioned scheme. Western powers turned Dubrovnik into one of the most significant intelligence centers. A successful formula the Ragusans had worked out long before in establishing pragmatic co-existence with the Porte gave way to an alternative, in the form of an ideology which advocated risky campaigns in the East. Counter-Ottoman initiatives in Europe, with their political and religious elements, influenced the appearance of genuine panslavism, permeated with Catholic proselytism among the Ragusan nobility and the educated citizen elite.<sup>9</sup> The Jesuits,

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<sup>8</sup> According to the dispatches received between 1608 and 1611, the Senate's anxiety was well-grounded. From the information the Senate gathered, the initial phase of the counter-Ottoman campaign involved the pope, the King of Spain, Archduke of Austria, and Duke of Savoy. The attack was to be launched from the direction of the Albanian coast, across the lands of the Austrian Archduke (across Croatia most likely) and the territory of Dubrovnik, from where the allied troops were to invade Herzegovina. *Dubrovačka akta i povelje*: pp. 273-278.

<sup>9</sup> Jakov Resti himself testified on the religious, proselyte motives of the conspirators. The latter, namely, hoped that the Orthodox, "Rasciani", who considerably outnumbered the Turks, would adopt Catholicism. *Dubrovačka akta i povelje*: p. 318; Z. Zlatar, *Our Kingdom Come*: pp. 303-304. Yet the religious element of the Conspiracy was not single-sided. It was the famous Benedictine Mavro Orbini, author of *Il Regno degli Slavi*, the work in which he promoted the "ideology" of panslavism in the spirit of the Counter-Reformation, that in the very first days of the Conspiracy, denounced to the authorities fra Santo, a layman from Mljet, who was a messenger and one of the first confidants of the Savoy duke in Dubrovnik (*Dubrovačka akta i povelje*: pp. 190-192, 300-302). On the other hand, Orbini's influence on the bishop of Ston, Miho Resti, with whom he started collaborating in 1610, at the time of the Conspiracy, is still shrouded in obscurity. The Senate's decision of November 1610, by which Orbini was banished from Ston and its bishopry, is more than indicative because the bishop himself took active part in the Conspiracy. Orbini's death in November of 1610 provides plenty of ground for speculation on his role in the whole affair.

too, contributed to the scene, their newly established Ragusan society being led by Aleksandar Komulović between 1604 and 1608. Thus it should not come as a surprise that a group of the Ragusan patricians consorted with Charles Emmanuel, seeing in his plan a chance for the Ragusan territorial and political expansion, but also their personal promotion. The contacts between the Savoy court and the rulers of Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, and the representatives of the Catholic and the Orthodox Church generally took place somewhere on the Dubrovnik estate, and the Senate was certainly not unaware of the affairs. Savoy's intelligence network involved a number of Ragusans from the very beginning of the political activities. Among the first and by far most trusted men siding with Charles Emmanuel was a distinguished and highly influential patrician Marin Resti. He headed the patrician group which supported radical changes of the current Ragusan policy and its active participation in the counter-Ottoman campaigns. He was soon joined by his brothers, Lucijan and Ivan Resti, and Jakov Resti (\*1578), a relative of his and a particularly trusted confidant. The latter enjoyed the support of his brothers Miho, bishop of Ston, Petar-Andrija and Mato Resti. The members of the Resti family were subsequently joined by Jakov Giorgi (\*1575) and his brothers, Stjepan, and Marin, although they did not take direct part in the Conspiracy. The Resti-Giorgi clan multiplied, as a considerable number of kin and members of other families, such as Sabo Menze, Marin Cerva, and Jakov Luccari, together with several citizens and clerics, grouped around them.

Counting on the rebels' support, the ultimate goal of Charles Emmanuel was to occupy as much Ottoman territory in the European part of the Empire as possible. Claiming diverse medieval dynastic traditions, he intended to crown himself King of Rumelia, although the historical identity of this "Kingdom" was dubious and its territory vague. By the end of 1607 the confidants of the Savoy Duke visited the island of Mljet and Dubrovnik, with intent to present the rebel leaders with financial support and acquire affiliates among the Ragusan patricians. Imberto Saluzzio, known as *commendator della Manta*, and Filiberto Provona, under the guise of horse tradesmen, took full advantage of the visit to instruct the rebels and draw precise charts of the City fortifications.<sup>10</sup> But Joan-

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<sup>10</sup> The proof of Della Manta and Provona's earnest efforts to accomplish their mission are the two most precisely charted planimetric maps of the city and the fortifications, along with a drawing of the Dubrovnik port. The maps are filed at the State Archives in Turin. They have been published by Ilario Principe, who successfully established their date but failed to offer any historical background. Ilario Principe, »Tri neobjavljene karte Dubrovnika iz XVI.-XVII. st.«, *Dubrovnik N.S.* 2/1 (1991): pp. 191-202. Cf. Z. Zlatar, *Our Kingdom Come*: p. 272.



nes Renesi, another of Duke's confidants, assigned to inspect the territory in the hinterland, harboured serious doubts as to whether the leaders of various rebel groups he had contacted were able to stand up to the Ottomans. Convinced that the majority of the population had no desire to "replace the Ottoman tyranny with the Spanish rule", Renesi reported euphemistically that the campaign rests upon "very shaky ground".<sup>11</sup> This report had a most discouraging effect upon the Duke who almost gave up on the idea.

The conspiring episode in Dubrovnik history may well have had a different course if, in April 1609, Jakov Giorgi and Jakov Resti had not been banished from the Republic. When a notable and wealthy citizen Dinko Facenda denounced Giorgi and Resti before the Senate for having committed adultery with his wife, the two accused, accompanied by a couple of friends, beat the man to death. The fact that they were sentenced to a twenty-year exile no doubt helped Resti and Giorgi side with the Duke for good, finding shelter at his court in Turin. Living a life of wealth and privilege, Giorgi and Resti, together with Marin Resti who, because of his collaboration with the Duke had been banished from the Republic somewhat later, resumed the preparations for the invasion across the Ragusan territory. Meanwhile, they tried to put pressure on the Senate with a series of pardon pleas. By the end of 1609 they were to undertake a secret mission in Konavle where they met with the affiliates from Montenegro, Boka (the Bay of Kotor), and Albania. Their persistence was finally rewarded. Perhaps in hope of soothing the matter, which was becoming a serious menace to the Republic, the Senate eventually pardoned them by the end of 1610, after a series of rejections.<sup>12</sup> The conspirators, however, did not abandon their mission, but remained in Italy, ready to carry out their plan. Meanwhile, Charles Emmanuel completely withdrew from the action, the leadership being readily accepted by Vincenzo I Gonzaga, duke of Mantua. The court of Mantua offered hospitality to the Ragusan conspirators, still working together for a common end.

In August 1611, a carelessly and hastily planned invasion started when *Flemish*, a warship of the Mantuan duke, armed with 42 cannons and carrying 300 crew, sailed into the waters of Dubrovnik. Purchased in the Netherlands, the vessel was laden with various kinds of weapons and ammunition

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<sup>11</sup> Z. Zlatar, *Our Kingdom Come*: pp. 271-276.

<sup>12</sup> *Acta Consilii Rogatorum*, vol. 82, ff. 205v, 207v (SAD).



for the rebels, ready for the eventual occupation of two strategic posts within Ragusan territory (Ston and Molunat). Jakov Resti, Jakov Giorgi, and an ex-layman of the Benedictines of Mljet, friar Santo, were on board. Marin Resti was supposed to be in charge of the mainland operation. After he had met in Slano with his brothers Ivan and Miho, and his nephew, Marin Sorgo, at the time count of Slano, Marin Resti boarded the vessel in the Pelješac Channel and set off southwards where he was to meet the rebel leaders and inform them about the oncoming Spanish invasion of the Bay of Kotor. At the beginning of September, Jakov Giorgi and Jakov Resti secretly disembarked in order to meet with their kin and partisans.

The Senate was excellently informed on the conspirators' whereabouts and their intentions.<sup>13</sup> Guided by safety precautions, the Senate recurrently increased the number of guards posted on the walls and fortifications of Ston and Dubrovnik. Venice, too, was informed about the presence of the Mantuan warship, for the Venetians were strongly against counter-Ottoman actions under Spanish patronage. While Resti and Giorgi were off board, the Venetian fleet attacked their vessel. This incident forced the Mantuan warship to leave the Ragusan territorial waters before any information from the rebel leaders was received. The plan thus failed. Resti and Giorgi were soon apprehended and cast into prison. September 5, 1611, marked the beginning of a trial which further deepened the rift within the Ragusan patriciate.

Zdenko Zlatar bases his interpretation of the conflict on the "pro-Ottoman" and "counter-Ottoman" political polarization of the two patrician factions. But, in our opinion, a mere ideological element, i.e., "pro-Ottoman" and "counter-Ottoman" component of the conflict would be insufficient to stir such a large-scale division among the patriciate. The actions of the Ragusan government in following up with the Conspiracy prove that a decisive majority of the senators were convinced that an open counter-Ottoman policy in the existing power balance would harm the Republic, and would certainly threaten

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<sup>13</sup> The Senate undertook a full investigation into the conspirators' activities. Apart from the interrogation of the witnesses with whom they contacted, the government was directly informed about the conspirators' schemes from their headquarters in Turin. The Ragusan spy at the court of the Duke of Savoy was Franjo Biondi of Hvar, who kept the Senate regularly posted on all the plans conceived within the counter-Ottoman coalition. Curiously, Biondi states that the plot enjoys full support of France and Holland with an aim to disqualify Dubrovnik from the trade and shipping competition. V. Foretić, *Povijest Dubrovnika II*: p. 76.

its welfare. A pragmatic view on the issue did not a priori imply pro-Ottoman policy. Merely, the majority of the patricians played wisely and supported a political status quo in the Ottoman relations, but this tactical position was far from any sort of active support to the Ottomans. Thus determining the group which demanded the capital punishment for the conspirators as “pro-Ottoman” is neither accurate nor appropriate. Rather, in the Great Conspiracy context, they may be distinguished as the “Republican loyalists”, and in a wider perspective—a “pragmatic” political faction.

The principally unanimous pragmatic attitude towards the possible danger of involving the Republic into a war conflict gradually lost in significance when the conspirators were to be sentenced. But, the agnatic moment proved to be the essential source of division: the patricians disagreed on the character and form of the punishment for the crime the conspirators had committed. That is why the hearings of the suspected had been postponed for almost a month. Although the course of the investigation revealed a plan according to which certain parts of the Ragusan territory were to be occupied, it remained unclear as to whether the conspirators attempted to mount a coup in the Republic. On October 11, by a vote of 22 for and 16 against, the Senate decided to put the accused to torture and elicit the confession of the Conspiracy. But the defendant’s bravery during torture and their refusal to confess further complicated the passing of the sentence. Giorgi and Resti admitted to their political proselyte motives in taking part in the foreactions of the Christian armada assigned to launch the invasion and, with the rebel support, it was to liberate “Albania and Serbia” of the “heathens”. They claimed that the welfare of the country was their only guidance, for an advantageous victory would not only mean an expansion of the Catholicism in the broader Dubrovnik hinterland, but also the Republic’s relief from the burdensome tribute and the lasting Ottoman menace. Lastly, they believed that the Western rulers would consent to the territorial expansion of the Dubrovnik state.<sup>14</sup>

The discussion on the sentence issue took place within the frames of agnatic groupings on the Senate and on the Major Council. The events which followed prove that the animosities between the families developed from the

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<sup>14</sup> Z. Zlatar, *Our Kingdom Come*: pp. 303-306.

personal feuds of certain members of patrician families and *casate*.<sup>15</sup> After an elaborate investigation and questioning of the accused and their kin, as well as all those believed to have some direct or indirect knowledge about the Conspiracy, on November 10, 1611, with the majority of 29 votes to 11, the Senate passed the guilty verdict. The decision about punishing or not, however, narrowed the votes to 26 in favour and 14 opposed. The patricians finally split over the decision on capital punishment which could not have been voted out because the vote ratio was 20 to 20. Namely, twenty senators voted for life imprisonment as an alternative sentence.<sup>16</sup> This issue definitely split the Senate and other patricians into two irreconcilable factions. The defendant's kin and friends, on the verge of military revolt, refused to accept the drastic sentence, while those in favour of the death penalty considered it the right decision when high treason was in question. Those in favour of the capital punishment were headed by the senators Marko Bassegli and Jero Ghetaldi, whereas their opponents, flocked around the notable Vladislav Menze, who argued vehemently for a mitigated sentence and against death. As a result, voting 28 for and 12 against, it was decided that Resti and Giorgi were to be imprisoned in the dungeon within the Rector's Palace under extremely harsh conditions. In order to secure the normal functioning of the councils and prevent the patriciate's open conflict, the Senate decreed a series of very strict measures against disorderly conduct. In addition, a committee of five members was appointed to investigate the case and report on all the occurrences related to the Conspiracy.<sup>17</sup>

The fact that the master mind of the Conspiracy, Marin Resti, was still at large and had not given up on the idea of invasion warmed up the tensions. On the other hand, the Ottomans were likely to lose confidence in the Republic. In the midst of the controversy, in February 1612, Vladislav Menze, the conspirators' most authoritative advocate, was elected rector. By the close of the month, probably in the night of February 23, while the rector and his fam-

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<sup>15</sup> A long-drawn-out feud characterized the relationship between the head prosecutor, Marko Bassegli, and the conspirators' defence counsel, Vladislav Menze. (Cf. Z. Zlatar, *Our Kingdom Come*: pp. 309-310). Their animosity evolved into an open political conflict, and is an illustrative example of the complex dynamics of the development of factions. Controversial political positions do appear suggestive and well-grounded in the international political context, but in the patrician groupings on the Republic councils, they reveal a latent agnatic and clan dimension.

<sup>16</sup> *Dubrovačka akta i povelje*: pp. 263-264.

<sup>17</sup> *Dubrovačka akta i povelje*: pp. 264-269.

ily were attending a carnival party outside the Rector's Palace, unexpected events took course.<sup>18</sup> The prisoners managed to break through the ceiling of the cell, escape through the rector's premises and across the city walls, and reach the port where Miho Resti, bishop of Ston, was awaiting in a boat. The fugitives set off towards Korčula and Hvar, and then Italy. As the escape remained undetected until the following morning, it was quite clear that the rector himself must have been one of the accomplices, together with the prisoners' fully supportive kin. The rector's guilt, however, could not be established. The successful escape contributed to the lessening of the tensions in the councils, for the conspirators were sentenced in absence, and the execution of the capital penalty was ruled out of order.<sup>19</sup>

Yet the conflict between the factions was again intensified with the arrest of the brothers and kin of the two fugitives. A tactful approach of Vladislav Menze helped him not only avoid the eventual negative consequences due to his role in the Resti-Giorgi affair, but he also managed to win the support of the Senate and to be elected to the influential office of the *proveditori*.<sup>20</sup> The conspirators' kin, however, could not escape the punishment. The brother of Jakov Resti, Petar-Andrija, was sentenced to eight years of banishment and was forbidden permanent residence in the states under the rule of the Austrian archduke and the dukes of Mantua and Savoy. Highly positioned in the Church hierarchy, Jakov's second brother Miho, bishop of Ston, was sentenced in absence to a two-year exile on the islet of St. Andrew, while the third brother, Mato, was only reproached. Lucijan, brother of Marin Resti, was sentenced to four years of banishment under the same conditions as Petar-Andrija Resti.

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<sup>18</sup> The Senate records and documents related to the Conspiracy do not contain the exact date of the escape. The fact that the first discussion on it took place on March 4 led most authors to speculate on it being March 3. The latter date is also cited by Z. Zlatar (*Between the Double Eagle and the Crescent*: p. 100). February 23, 1612, however, would appear a more likely date, a reference of which was also made in the Venetian report and on which Zlatar decided in one of his later books (*Our Kingdom Come*: p. 310). Namely, Vladislav Menze, suspected of collaborating with the conspirators, held his rectorship in February and not in March.

<sup>19</sup> On March 4, 1612, the Senate voted in favour of death sentence for all those concealing any information on the conspirators, a price of 3,000 ducats being set on their heads. *Dubrovačka akta i povelje*: pp. 278-280.

<sup>20</sup> Z. Zlatar, *Our Kingdom Come*: p. 312. The fact that after the escape Rafael Bona, Resti's uncle, was elected rector for March testifies of the gradual predominance of the pro-conspiratorial faction.

The same sentence was passed onto Stjepan Giorgi, brother of Jakov Giorgi, while the third brother, Mato, was acquitted, and so were Resti's cousins, Marin Gradi and Marin Bobali.<sup>21</sup>

Although the counter-Ottoman plans lost greatly in significance with the death of the Mantuan Duke Vincenzo in February 1612 and the succession of Emperor Rudolph at the Habsburg throne, the conflict caused by the Great Conspiracy perpetuated into a deep agnatic and political rift within the patriciate.

#### *4. The deepening of the rift after the Great Conspiracy*

As during the investigation into the Conspiracy the Senate acted unanimously, the Ragusan sources tended to present the political motives of the Resti-Giorgi group as being exclusively treasonal, that is, contrary to the interests of the state. But the testimonies of the conspirators, the result of the conspiracy, and the rift it caused within the patriciate point to a significantly different and multifaceted social and political context in which the "treason" may be interpreted as a legitimate and patriotic act. The version which prevailed in the contemporary documents was actually a politically contextualized version of the rival faction. However, in the political sense, the future gradually affirmed the conspiring group.

After the escape of the conspirators in February 1612, Marin Resti appeared to be the most common cause of the Republic's headaches. Archduke Charles Habsburg, who had started the war against Venice, appointed Resti commander in Senj. In May 1612, taking advantage of the Veneto-Habsburg conflict, Resti attacked parts of Pelješac and Primorje with 400 Uskoks, ravaging and plundering the estates of his opponents, and attempting in vain to invade Ston.<sup>22</sup> The crisis contributed to the consolidation of Bassegli's pragmatic faction, which advocated additional measures of surveillance and defense of the Republic borders. The international scene was equally tense due to the Veneto-Spanish conflict in the Adriatic, triggered by the Vice-King of Naples, Pedro Ossuna. The latter combined his hostility towards Venice with the current counter-Ottoman campaign which was still support-

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<sup>21</sup> *Dubrovačka akta i povelje*: pp. 282-284. Marin Resti, Jakov Resti, Jakov Giorgi, and Miho Resti, bishop of Ston, remained in exile until death.

<sup>22</sup> V. Foretić, *Povijest Dubrovnika II*: p. 76; Z. Zlatar, *Our Kingdom Come*: p. 314.

ed by the Duke of Savoy and the Habsburg Archduke. Furthermore, it was the Kingdom of Naples that offered protection to Jakov Resti and Jakov Giorgi, while Bishop Miho Resti was supported by the pope himself. With the intrusion of the Spanish fleet into the Adriatic in the spring of 1617, the Republic found itself in an unpleasant political situation. Namely, the Spanish vessels sailed into the port of Gruž on several occasions, and the Republic helped Ossuna in various ways on account of the former alliance between the two states. The Ottomans accused the Senate for open collaboration with Spain and the Venetian fleet threatened to blockade the city and attack it. Thanks to a masterly diplomatic manoeuvre, in which the Ragusans provided all the parties with the intelligence they required, the Republic managed to escape more serious consequences. As will be witnessed again on a number of occasions, problems concerning the foreign affairs partly overshadowed and slowed down the inner-class conflicts. During the Veneto-Spanish conflicts in the Adriatic (1617-1619), Venetian reports advert to three factions within the Ragusan patriciate: the pro-Spanish, the pro-Venetian, and the strongest, pro-Ottoman faction.<sup>23</sup> This denomination should, of course, be taken with reserve and primarily as proof of the continuation of the patriciate's agnatic and political grouping.

The conflict in the Adriatic ended with the Spanish retreat in 1620. With the close of the first epoch of most intense counter-Ottoman actions initiated by the Western powers, the activities of the banished Ragusan conspirators considerably lost in broader political significance. Both factions originating from the period of the Conspiracy share credit for the Republic's survival of the crisis. Thanks to the pragmatic faction, Dubrovnik managed to regain the necessary favourable position with the Ottomans, whereas the conspirators' faction remained loyal to Spain.

It seems that the clear-cut distinction of the two groups was a long-running process. The rift within the patriciate after the Conspiracy is more than apparent, yet makes Zlatar's model, according to which the main motive of division is the continuous conflict between the two opposed groups with the

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<sup>23</sup> In the midst of Venice's conflict with the Vice-king of Naples in 1612, a so-called "Spanish plot" was disclosed among the Venetian patriciate. If the coup d'état had succeeded, the Venetian policy would be completely subjected to the Spanish counter-Ottoman plans in the Balkans. Cf. Vuk Vinaver, »Turska i Dubrovnik u doba španske invazije Jadranskog mora (1617-1619 godine)«. *Istorijski glasnik* 4/1 (1952): pp. 21-59; Z. Zlatar, *Our Kingdom Come*: pp. 314-324.

strong “pro- and counter-Ottoman” ideological positions, hardly acceptable. Namely, the political position of the Republic in view of the Ottomans, Venetians, and the Habsburgs during the Candian War (1645-1669), post-earthquake crisis (1667), and the Vienna War (1683-1699) experienced unexpected changes. Ideological differences among the patricians are hardly traceable from the sources, as provisional political pragmatism prevailed, and all the political efforts were subjected to the struggle for the Republic’s well-being.

Genealogical analysis of the rift in the first half of the 17th century provides a more accurate interpretation, assuming that the polarization of the two political factions took place gradually, according to the double key: on the basis of agnatic ties and following the political situation. The development of the patrician rift thus features as a complex diachronic process which we shall analyze on both the genealogical level and that of the political competition for the monopolization of institutional power. As the official sources provide little reliable data on the further development of the division along the political and ideological lines, a comprehensive genealogical reconstruction will reveal a most distinct pattern of the rift.

##### *5. Marginalization of the defeated faction, illustrated on the career of Ivan Gundulić*

A one-sided and oversimplified interpretation of the patrician conflict as in Zlatar’s pro- and counter-Ottoman model in the analysis of the later course of the class rift calls for considerable intervention. In this respect, our attention should be drawn to a *casata*, the member of which was Ivan Gundulić (1589-1638), the poet. Namely, the latter’s father and uncle, Frano and Toma Gondola, during the conspiracy trial sided with the “Republican loyalists”, who were headed by Marko Bassegli. Their cousin, Jero Gondola (Table 1), however, was recruited by the conspirators’ faction, i.e., “counter-Ottoman” group under the lead of Vladislav Menze.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, the Gondola family split during the Great Conspiracy. Genealogical analysis of the poet’s des-

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<sup>24</sup> Jero Gondola, son of Frano, was one of the tutors that Frano Gondola had authorized in 1592 to run the estate of the three-year-old Ivan Gundulić. Đuro Körbler mistook Jero Gondola for another Jero, son of Ivan and poet’s other uncle to whom *Suze sina razmetnoga* were dedicated. Cf. *Djela Điva Frana Gundulića*, ed. Đuro Körbler. [Stari pisci hrvatski, 9]. Zagreb: JAZU, 1919: p. III.



cendants during and after the aggregation of the new nobility confirms that his *casata* belonged to the Sorbonnist group of the Ragusan patriciate. With his wife Nika, daughter of Šiško Sorgo (†1644), Gundulić had three sons. The eldest, Frano (1630-1700), marshal and chamberlain at the court of Leopold of Habsburg, disregarded the strict endogamous rules and in 1674 married a foreigner, Countess Octavia Margarita Strozzi, having no heirs in Dubrovnik.<sup>25</sup> The youngest, Mato (1636-1684), spent several years in the military service of the Spanish Habsburgs, too. After his return to Dubrovnik, Mato married a nonnoble, but had no children. In 1668, Šiško (1633-1682), Gundulić's second son, also remarried a commoner from a distinguished citizen family, Kata Nale, which fully confirms his Sorbonnist affiliation.<sup>26</sup>

During the life of Ivan Gundulić and his sons, their *casata* was still rather highly-positioned on the political scene. Both Mato and Šiško Gondola had been elected rectors of the Republic, and interestingly, both of them died while holding the office. But with Šiško's descendants, Ivan (1678-1721) and Šiško (1682-1758), the situation proved quite different.<sup>27</sup> There is a striking relationship between their Sorbonnist identity and their unsuccessful political career. In the 18th century and until its extinction, the Gondola family occupied the bottom position on the ladder of political offices, being ranked even below the new noble families (Tables 12 and 13).

An open question remains: was the political marginalization of the Sorbonnist Gondola family influenced by the ideological elements of the poetic works of Ivan Gundulić, particularly *Dubravka* and *Osman*? The history of literature systematically examines Gundulić's complex opus, especially in terms of its poetic structure, form, and composition, comparing it with the

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<sup>25</sup> On military service of Frano and Mato Gondola see: Mirko Deanović, »Frano Dživa Gundulića i njegov put u Moskvu«, *Starine* 41 (1948): pp. 7-59. In the absence of parish registers, we have not been able to establish the data on the marriage of Mato Gondola. One of Frano's letters reveals that he too, following Šiško's example, was married to a nonnoble. (M. Deanović, »Frano Dživa Gundulića«: p. 12).

<sup>26</sup> The Nale (Nalješković) family was never admitted into the Ragusan patriciate, as erroneously concluded by Đuro Körbler (*Djela Điva Frana Gundulića*: p. XI). Similar to their brother Frano, who married a foreigner, Mato and Šiško Gondola took advantage of the provisional decisions on the liberalization of marriage.

<sup>27</sup> Following the established inner-class endogamy, the poets's grandsons, Ivan and Šiško Gondola, married two Sorbonnist brides: Lukrecija Bona and Ore Ghetaldi. In 1697, their sister, Nika, also married a Sorbonnist, Petar Sorgo, and her grandson by the name of Petar Sorgo is credited for having revised Gundulić's *Osman*.

Table 1. Factions in the Great Conspiracy of 1610/12 by senatorship

Family	Senator		
	"Conspirators"	"Republican loyalists"	"Grey" area
<i>Total</i>	13	12	29
BASSEGLI		Marko son of Toma	Ivan son of Andrija
BENESSA		Kristo son of Jakob	
BONA	Luka son of Marin	Vladislav son of Marin	Stjepan son of Nikola
		Jeronim son of Junije	Toma son of Junije
			Šimun son of Luka
			Junije son of Marin
			Miho son of Marin
BONDA			Jeronim son of Ivan
BUCCHIA	Nikola son of Luka		
CABOGA			Mato son of Ivan
			Frano son of Serafin
CERVA			Dragoje son of Luka
GIORGI	Šiško son of Jeronim		
	Šiško son of Ivan		
	Dominik son of Ivan		
GONDOLA	Jeronim son of Frano	Toma son of Ivan	Sekundo son of Benedikt
		Frano son of Ivan	Pavao son of Marinko
			Luka son of Marin
GHETALDI		Jeronim son of Vito	Marin son of Vito
GOZZE		Ivan son of Savin	Đuro son of Marin
			Marin son of Rado
			Nikola son of Rado
GRADI	Frano son of Đuro	Nikola son of Stjepan	Mato son of Junije

Family	Senator		
	"Conspirators"	"Republican loyalists"	"Grey" area
LUCCARI			Jakob son of Petar
			Damjan son of Petar
			Marin son of Marin
MENZE	Vladislav son of Nikola		Marko son of Ivan
	Nikola son of Sebastijan		
	Ivan son of Pavao		
PALMOTA			Ivan son of Nikola
POZZA			Mato son of Damjan
RESTI	Frano son of Ivan		
	Orsat son of Andrija		
RAGNINA			Jeronim son of Nikola
SARACA		Lujo son of Božo	
		Ivan son of Božo	
SORGO	Jeronim son of Frano		Nikola son of Junije
			Vlaho son of Nikola
			Gauge son of Nikola
TUDISI		Nikola son of Božo	Frano son of Marin

Source: Z. Zlatar, *Our Kingdom Come*: pp. 341-343, 345-349.

work or his predecessors and contemporaries. The biographical data on Gundulić are commonly studied within the political framework of the period of the Catholic Counter-Reformation and the crisis of the Ragusan society at the dawn of the 17th century. On the other hand, historiographic interpretations of the political and social conditions prevailing in the Gundulić's Dubrovnik rarely make use of the semantic diversity of his works. In historiographic analysis, the correlation between the narrative and allegorical layers of Gundulić's poetic work and the Ragusan political environment has remained almost undetected.

Ivan Gundulić became member of the Major Council in 1608 and eyewitnessed the stirring events of the Conspiracy and the rift which followed. It is quite understandable that Gundulić would comment on the political events and processes he witnessed from his own aesthetical and poetical view. Thus his works may also be interpreted in the context of the rift within the Ragusan patriciate. Some literary historians point to a number of Gundulić's versed allusions to the conspirators, the "betrayal of freedom" and the "domestic battle".<sup>28</sup> In his historiographic reinterpretation of *Dubravka*, Zdenko Zlatar rejected some previous misconceptions and provided most solid explanation of its key political background.<sup>29</sup> *Dubravka* is a poetical and allegorical drama about the freedom of Dubrovnik. Based on ancient mythological elements, the drama is wrapped in the form of a pastoral, by means of which he found it most appropriate to personify the Golden Age, the mythic state of undisturbed civic harmony. By glorifying the Golden Age of Dubrava as opposed to the menacing events, Gundulić resorts to allegory in order to describe the evolution of the patrician disunity and class disharmony. The genuine value of the Ragusan freedom, founded on the patrician rule, manifests when Dubrava is threatened by the powers of evil behind the scene. Decoded politically, *Dubravka*, among other things, tells the story of the patrician rift.

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<sup>28</sup> This particularly refers to Vsevolod Setschkareff, Milan Ratković, Miroslav Pantić, and Slobodan Prosperov Novak. Cf. Vsevolod Setschkareff, *Die Dichtungen Gundulić's und ihr poetischer Stil*. Bonn: Athenaem-Verlag, 1952; Ivan Gundulić, *Osman*, ed. Milan Ratković. Zagreb: Zora, 1955; Dživo Gundulić, *Izabrana dela*, ed. Miroslav Pantić. Beograd, 1964. Slobodan Prosperov Novak provides a new and complex interpretation of the typically Ragusan political ideological level in Gundulić's works. Slobodan Prosperov Novak, *Povijest hrvatske književnosti*, III. Zagreb: Antibarbarus, 1999: pp. 226-277.

<sup>29</sup> Zlatar argued against Jakša Ravlić's thesis on *Dubravka*, naively constructed in the manner of dialectal materialism, as an allegory of class conflict, reflecting the struggle between the rising "bourgeoisie" and the impoverished nobility. Cf. Jakša Ravlić, »Odraž domaće stvarnosti u dubrovačkoj književnosti. Ivan Gundulić i njegova Dubravka«. *Anali Historijskog instituta JAZU u Dubrovniku* 4-5 (1956): pp. 323-353. According to his interpretation, Gundulić speaks from the conservative, aristocratic position, criticizing the citizens who buy their way up the Republic's political hierarchy. In view of the historical facts and the nature of the Ragusan class society, Ravlić's thesis is perfectly groundless. Within the Ragusan concept of aristocratic government and class order, the citizenry, however wealthy it may have been, was never a political subject. Namely, the ultimate and unattainable goal the wealthy citizens pursued until the last day of the Republic was to join the patriciate and not fight against them and the specific aristocratic republicanism. Zdenko Zlatar, *The Slavic Epic: Gundulić's Osman*. New York: Peter Lang etc., 1993: pp. 112-113; Zdenko Zlatar, »Božanstvena komedija Ivana Gundulića: Nova interpretacija pjesnikove razvojne linije«. *Dubrovnik* N.S. 2/1 (1991): pp. 124-162.

Within the poetic reflection of the contemporary ferment, Gundulić forewarns: once the aristocratic harmony disappears, the much-celebrated Ragusan freedom will follow too.

The ideological dimension of the conflict, i.e., the “pro-” and “counter-Ottoman” paradigm, should be correlated with an insight into the position of Gundulić himself and his family against the conspirators’ faction. Remarkably enough, Zdenko Zlatar is among those who failed to interpret the poet’s explicit condemnation of those responsible for the crisis: those who bribe and are bribed, money-grubbers who “present Dubrava with gifts” and to whom gold is a substitute for virtue. The drama is swarming with Gundulić’s allusions and contempt towards all those capable of corrupting Dubravka, i.e., the Ragusan government, and who even bribe the judges with gold so that “all the laws are annihilated and the freedom destroyed”. The abstract essence of the divisive powers is personified by Grdan, a monster who wins Dubrava through corruption and bribe, but to whom the poet assigns a back-stage role, leaving him unseen and speechless.

Needless to say, from his poetical perspective, Gundulić in *Dubravka* was not in the position to offer a political solution to the problem, i.e., the advancing Machiavellianism within the class which proved merciless in destroying the medieval homogeneity. A happy and unexpected ending of this theological and political allegory—Dubravka is being rescued from Grdan’s hands and is united with Miljenko—was but a gift from Heaven. God Himself, *Deus ex machina*, saves Dubravka, the freedom, patriciate’s power, the virtue of the aristocracy—the Republic itself.

With its voluminosity and narrative fabric, *Osman* exceeds *Dubravka* in complexity. Despite a somewhat dispersed historical theme involving a broad range of international events, this epic is even more significant for the highlighting of the rift problem. The story of a Turkish sultan and a Polish prince, interwoven with a myriad of historical, romantic, and eschatological digressions, is, in fact, an epic of Dubrovnik. In order to interpret the apparent contradiction between the seemingly counter-Ottoman character of Gundulić’s *Osman*, and the fact that the author belonged to the adverse, “pragmatic” faction, we should once again put aside the strict “pro-” and “counter-Ottoman” key. Judging by the poet’s agnatic identity, his fierce argumentation against the Ottoman institutional system may strike as illogical. It seems, however, that Gundulić’s main focus was on the criticism of the

governmental model, here being monarchical autocracy, because in *Osman*, as more recent study of his epic has shown, the poet developed the main theme much deeper than the apparent criticism of Islam and the Ottoman Empire.<sup>30</sup> Regardless of the critical appraisal, Gundulić's orientalism in *Osman* is merely a setting in which the poet presents over and again the Ragusan position. Thus the assertion of Slobodan P. Novak, according to which "*Osman* displays an abundance of the political and philosophical digressions related to the fate of the poet's Republic"<sup>31</sup> provides an excellent starting-point for the historian researching the rift among the Ragusan patriciate. In *Osman* Gundulić renders himself as a genuine Ragusan, nobleman, and a member of the political faction which balances between the Lion and the Draco, and which in the policy of noninterference sees the warrant of the Ragusan freedom. By stating that "Gundulić's lines mirror the coldness of the Ragusan pragmatism, the very coldness that helped the Republic manoeuvre successfully between the East and the West",<sup>32</sup> Novak has rightly anticipated Gundulić's agnatically-based political orientation. Viewed in the light of the nature of the conflict, the poet's seemingly counter-Ottoman position proves in fact as an excellent poetic and ideological argumentation of the pragmatic faction in the rift.

In the absence of more reliable historical sources, it is the allegorical layers of Gundulić's epic, indirect and manneristic in their appeal for the revival of aristocratic harmony, that testify to the initial phase of the patrician division. Though in this early stage divisive criteria were not clearly established, yet the disastrous impact upon the very foundations of the Ragusan state was anticipated. Observer and poet, Ivan Gundulić interwove into his poetic fabric the ideological premise for the survival of the Republic of Dubrovnik.

## 6. The analysis of agnatic participation in the Great Conspiracy

In order to establish a link between the political conflict at the time of the Great Conspiracy and the racial rift that followed, we have compared agnatic participation in different factions during the Conspiracy with the *casata*-based groups of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists which consolidated

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<sup>30</sup> Zoran Kravar, »Svjetovi "Osmana"«. *Dubrovnik* N.S. 2/1 (1991): pp. 106-108; S. P. Novak, *Povijest hrvatske književnosti* III: pp. 256-275.

<sup>31</sup> S. P. Novak, *Povijest hrvatske književnosti* III: p. 265.

<sup>32</sup> S. P. Novak, *Povijest hrvatske književnosti* III: p. 269.

in the post-earthquake period, that is, 60 years after the Great Conspiracy. At the time, we have established 38 Salamancanist and 18 Sorbonnist branches of the patrician families (ratio 2.1 : 1), considering that some families participated in both factions (Table 1). In the absence of genealogical analysis of the patrician circle of the period, we have not been able to establish with exactitude which of the branches in the 1670s descend from the participants in the events 60 years earlier. Thus by means of coefficients we tried to calculate and determine the probable participation of the descendants of each senator holding office during the Great Conspiracy in the factions which were later formed. For the senators from the families whose branches belonged to one faction only, we used the coefficient 1, while for the senators whose families subsequently participated in both rival factions, the coefficients have been established in proportion to the number of branches within each group. Thus, for example, the Bona family with 3 Salamancanist and 3 Sorbonnist branches has the coefficient 0.5 (for the Salamancanists) and 0.5 (for the Sorbonnists), the Gozze (8 Salamancanist and 1 Sorbonnist branch) has the coefficient 0.89 (for the Salamancanists) and 0.11 (for the Sorbonnists), whereas the Sörgo (5 Salamancanist and 2 Sorbonnist branches) has the coefficient 0.71 (for the Salamancanists) and 0.29 (for the Sorbonnists), etc.

Despite the possible risks this analysis may run, primarily because of the inability to establish the political shifts of certain *casate* which most evidently took place over the sixty-year period, the results still prove indicative. The widest ratio gap between the Salamancanists- and the Sorbonnists-to-be in favour of the former may be observed among the senators who supported the conspirators (ratio 3.21 : 1, i.e., a deviation from the average ratio by +1.19 towards the Salamancanist faction). A most advantageous ratio to the Sorbonnists may be detected in the opposing faction, conditionally referred to as the “Republican loyalists” (1.45 : 1, a deviation from the average ratio by -0.57 towards the Sorbonnist faction), while the mean value rests in the so-called “grey area”, a term coined by Zdenko Zlatar,<sup>33</sup> denoting non-partisan senators (1.93 : 1, a deviation from the average ratio by -0.09) (Tables 1 and 2, Graph 1). Having in mind that the leading conspirators belong to the families which subsequently grouped exclusively around the Salamancanist core (Resti, Giorgi), there is every ground to believe that the Salamancanist-Sorbonnist class-division draws its roots from the eventful period of the

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
<sup>33</sup> Z. Zlatar, *Our Kingdom Come*: pp. 299-358.



Table 2. Faction participation of senators in the Great Conspiracy of 1610/12 by group their offspring belonged to after the 1667 earthquake

Senators in relation to faction participation in the Great Conspiracy 1610/12	Number of senators	Group the senators' offspring belonged to after 1667			
		Future Salaman-canists	Future Sorbonnists	Mean ratio between future Salaman-canists and future Sorbonnists	Deviation from the mean ratio between future Salaman-canists and future Sorbonnists
<i>Total</i>	51	30.87	20.13	1.53 : 1	0.00
"Conspirators"	13	9.21	3.79	2.43 : 1	0.90
"Republican loyalists"	12	6.45	5.55	1.16 : 1	0.37
"Grey" area	26	15.21	10.79	1.41 : 1	0.12

Graph 1. Faction participation of senators in the Great Conspiracy of 1610/12 by group their offspring belonged to after the 1667 earthquake



### Great Conspiracy.

The “counter-Ottoman” oriented conspirators who were sentenced to death won a political victory over the pragmatic faction of the “Republican loyalists”. Not only was their sentence mitigated, but also the conspirators were encouraged to escape. This incident further polarized the nobility, developing a rift between the conspirators’ kin and the prosecutors. In the course of the investigation a remarkable exchange of social roles took place, so that the traitors were eventually acclaimed heroes and the prosecutors labeled as hangmen. The majority of the politically neutral patricians sided with the party which booked a social victory. A strong agnatically based faction formed around the core of the conspiracy leaders, and became fully articulated after the aggregation of the new nobility in the 17th century; in the 18th century they were commonly called *Salamankezi* (the Salmancanists). For a century-and-a-half this faction played a dominant role in the Ragusan political life, while an inferior position was reserved for the so-called *Sorbonezi* (the Sorbonnists), who eventually coalesced with the new nobility.

### *7. The crisis of the patriciate in mid-seventeenth century and the aggregation of the new nobility*

A substantial decline in the number of patrician families, the great earthquake of 1667, and the Republic’s struggle for the political survival largely intensified the political conflicts, giving way to a yet deeper rift. The change of the broader geopolitical setting after the Vienna war provided new controversial issues on which the patricians polarized, their agnatic homogeneity being put to the greatest test since the Great Conspiracy. An unfinished “blood” grouping was a perfect base to an even deeper rift within the patriciate after the aggregation of the new nobility.

In the previous period, the last family was admitted among the nobles in 1336. That was the Bucchia family, whose members played a significant diplomatic role in the acquisition of the Pelješac peninsula, which was of great strategic interest.<sup>34</sup> Over the next 300 years, the Major Council, the body of all the adult male patricians, remained closed for new members. Although the participation of the nobility in the overall city population displayed a negative tendency, it was not until the 17th century that a serious

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<sup>34</sup> I. Mahnken, *Dubrovački patricijat u XIV veku*: p. 163.

biological crisis of the patriciate took place.<sup>35</sup> It is certain that the main reasons for the phenomenon of the thinning of the patrician ranks were other than economic.<sup>36</sup> Namely, the strict endogamous model proved fatal to the demographic processes, leading the rank to most certain extinction. Intuitive measures as part of individual family strategies (early marriage of a noblewoman in order to make the most of her fertile period, very close birth-spacing, consanguineous marriage, etc.) did prove reproductive in stable social conditions,<sup>37</sup> but were not effective enough in the crisis such as that after the earthquake in 1667, when the patrician rank was practically brought to the verge of existence.

The fact that the crisis of the elite was often on the agenda of the council meetings confirms that the patriciate identified the problem of its class reproduction long before the 1667 earthquake. The chances of stopping the negative trend were little because the traditional institutional model was very resistant to substantial changes. Subject to strong disapproval on behalf of certain noble circles, patrician consolidation by means of introducing new families into the rank proved a difficult and time-consuming process. Despite the aspiration to strengthen the aristocratic rank by admitting new families, these efforts led towards an even deeper rift within the patriciate.

By the mid-17th century the patriciate's deep-seated attitude towards the strict class endogamy became more liberal. The Senate's first proposition to

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<sup>35</sup> Writing on the early days of the Ragusan history, an anonymous annalist and Nikola Ragnina mention more than 150 patrician families, Diversis lists only 33 in 1440, and Serafin Razzi makes a reference to 29 living families in 1588. Milan Rešetar, »Popis dubrovačkih vlasteoskih porodica«, *Glasnik dubrovačkog učenog društva 'Sveti Vlaho'* 1 (1929): pp. 1-11.

<sup>36</sup> Dragoljub Pavlović was the first to come forward with a detailed analysis of the crisis of the Ragusan patriciate, which started with the seventeenth century. Dragoljub Pavlović, »O krizi vlasteoskog staleža u Dubrovniku XVII veka«, *Zbornik radova SANU* 17 (1952): pp. 27-38. On the basis of the research on the patricians' credit investments and the political context of their affairs, Pavlović's drastic assessment was rejected by Zdenko Zlatar. The latter concludes that in early seventeenth century the Ragusan patriciate still maintained the leading financial role in the import-export business market between Italy and the Balkans, and its substantial decline in number was a result of the long-standing demographic trends drawn out in the fourteenth century. According to Zlatar, the crisis developed from the patrician political conflict concerning the counter-Ottoman plans of the Western rulers. Zdenko Zlatar, »The 'Crisis' of the Patriciate in Early Seventeenth-Century Dubrovnik: A Reappraisal« *Balkanica* 6 (1975): pp. 111-131.

<sup>37</sup> For more details see: Nenad Vekarić et al., *Vrijeme ženidbe i ritam poroda: Dubrovnik i njegova okolica od 17. do 19. stoljeća*. Zagreb-Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku, 2000: pp. 108-109.

allow 5 citizen families to purchase their noble status for the amount of 10,000 ducats was denied on the Major Council session of November 15, 1646, with 82 votes against and 37 votes for.<sup>38</sup> It took the Senate 12 years to put the aggregation issue back on the agenda, and on November 19, 1658, the former assigned the *proveditori* to work out a regulation on the “preservation and reproduction” of the patriciate. Three years later, the law finally saw the light after the Senate’s repeated demand of March 24, 1661.<sup>39</sup> The regulation was acclaimed on the Major Council on March 26, 1662, with a close vote of 52 to 51 in favour.<sup>40</sup> The decision was entirely of principal nature and regulated the admission of new noble candidates from distinguished Ragusan merchant families or foreign nobility only when an old *casata* or *famiglia* died out, and by a majority of votes on all the three councils. This regulation produced little effect, and on January 18, 1664, the Senate passed yet another, more detailed rule pertaining to the aggregation procedure. It was decided that 10 new families would be admitted, together or respectively. The choice of each new family would have to be acclaimed by the majority of votes on all the three councils, the candidate being obliged to benefit the Republic with a contribution of 10,000 Spanish pesos. The decision further defined the family members who could acquire the noble prerogatives. They included husband and wife and their legitimate children, along with the husband’s single sisters and single brothers. It should be pointed out that neither this decision nor the preceding ones made any attempt to prejudice an inferior status of the new nobility in view of the old one. Conversely, it had been stated on several occasions that the newly admitted families would enjoy all the privileges and prerogatives of the patrician status. The decision was voted out on April 19, 1666 with a majority of 64 in favour to 33 against.<sup>41</sup>

Two years after this decision had been passed, in 1666, the last descendant of the Luccari noble family died, spurring the Senate to make a choice among

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<sup>38</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 39, ff. 31-32 (SAD). D. Pavlović, »O krizi vlasteoskog staleža«: p. 30.

<sup>39</sup> *Acta Consilii Rogatorum*, vol. 108, f. 283; vol. 110 (March 24); D. Pavlović, »O krizi vlasteoskog staleža«: p. 33.

<sup>40</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 43, f. 63; D. Pavlović, »O krizi vlasteoskog staleža«: pp. 33-34.

<sup>41</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 44, f. 90. The provision of 1664 did not explicitly repeat the clause of the law of 1662 that the new family would be aggregated only unless an old died out, but the course of the events which followed prove that it was so.

the proposed candidates for the nobility.<sup>42</sup> With the dying out of the Benessa family, the Senate announced another vacancy in the rank on July 27, 1666.<sup>43</sup> The first family was admitted on November 5, 1666, when the Major Council opened the patrician doors to one of the wealthiest citizens, Vlaho Bosdari, who contributed with 5,000 ducats to the Republic treasury.<sup>44</sup> During this session, the petition of another candidate, Miho Sorgo Bobali, was voted down with 48 to 47 votes. This well-to-do merchant and the Republic's diplomatic confidant in Venice was admitted during the next session, held on November 10, 1666, with 56 to 38 votes in favour.<sup>45</sup> At the same time the petitions of Petar Radagli, Marin and Ivan Dimitri, Miho Zlatarić, and Benedikt Marinetti Primi were denied at first, but after some reconsideration, admitted.<sup>46</sup>

In the meantime, on November 5, 1666, the Major Council decided on yet another weighty matter. The three regulations concerning the liberalization of marriage represented a small step towards permeability.<sup>47</sup> The first regulation annulled the formerly effective ban of patrician marriages in the third degree of consanguinity. The restrictive practice of marrying noblewomen from the Dalmatian cities was replaced by a regulation according to which any noble outsider was considered a suitable match, regardless of her local origin. The third and by far the most important regulation allowed the Ragusan patricians to choose their brides from the prominent citizen families, until decreed otherwise.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 44, f. 90.

<sup>43</sup> *Acta Consilii Rogatorum*, vol. 113, f. 184.

<sup>44</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, sv. 44, ff. 117v, 118. Bosdari was admitted with 51 vote in favour and 44 against, and his petition was on the Senate's agenda as early as October 30 (*Acta Consilii Rogatorum*, sv. 113, f. 214.).

<sup>45</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 44, ff. 119v-120v. On the merits of Sorgo-Bobali in the Republic's service during the Candian War, see V. Foretić, *Povijest Dubrovnika II*: pp. 104-114.

<sup>46</sup> *Acta Consilii Rogatorum*, vol. 113, f. 215v.

<sup>47</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 44, f. 115; D. Pavlović, »O krizi vlasteoskog staleža«: pp. 36-37.

<sup>48</sup> The first decision (54:36) apparently narrowed the marriage pool as it allowed marriage between close blood relations, but actually it was aimed at stimulating the patricians to marry, as, for example, great many noblewomen remained single because of the considerable dowries their fathers were to give the prospective son-in-laws from other patrician families. By marrying a closer relative, the dowry was smaller or was given to a member of the same family. The second decision (60:30) allowed marriage with foreign noblewomen. The third decision with the narrowest vote of 48 to 41 was aimed at stimulating the patricians to marry spouses from the well-off nonnoble families who would contribute with a substantial dowry.

Mass losses of patricians killed in the great earthquake of April 6, 1667, as well as the economic, financial, and political crisis which befell the Republic, speeded the process of aggregation of new families and worked to its advantage.<sup>49</sup> Thus on June 10, 1667, the Major Council instructed the *proveditori* to modify the regulation on the aggregation of 10 families with an intent to shorten the admission procedure, regardless of the vacancies available.<sup>50</sup> The status still had a price, 10,000 thaler, conditioned by a majority vote on all the three councils.<sup>51</sup>

On July 30, 1667, as a token of gratitude for community service in the post-earthquake period, another member of the Bosdari family, Diodat, was admitted into the patrician rank with a narrow vote. The same session witnessed the aggregation of three wealthier citizen families of Dubrovnik. Jakov Natali purchased his admission for 1,000 and Ivan Clasci (Klašić) for 600 Hungarian gold coins. Miho Zlatarić agreed to pay 3,000 daily wages, amounting to 1,300 *hyperperi* for the clearing away of the destroyed buildings.<sup>52</sup> On August 19, 1667, guided by the Republic's common welfare, the Major Council decided to add two more families to the list, not failing to stress that the newly admitted nobles would enjoy equal prerogatives as their old counterparts. On this session the Ragusan patriciate welcomed Cardinal Barberini to the council, a passionate advocate of Ragusan interests in Vatican, with his brothers and nephews.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> According to Zlatar's research, 376 patricians were sitting on the Major Council in 1600. Their number constantly declined, and in 1650 it came down to only 177 men (Z. Zlatar, *Our Kingdom Come*: p. 47). In the first two years after the 1667 earthquake, the sessions of the Major Council were attended by 60 members on average.

<sup>50</sup> This decision was voted on unanimously (10:0) during the Senate session held on June 3, 1667. *Acta Consilii Rogatorum*, vol. 114, f. 55. The Major Council confirmed the decision with a narrow majority of 20 to 18. *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 44, ff. 200-201.

<sup>51</sup> Particular cases of the aggregation of new nobles were on the voting agenda of the Major Council and the Senate only. As the Minor Council at the time consisted of senators, there was no need for the voting to be repeated. The amount contributed by the petitioner varied in practice, as each of them paid according to his financial ability.

<sup>52</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 44, ff. 208-211. Bosdari was admitted with 24 votes in favour and 22 opposed, Natali 26:20, Zlatarić 36:9, and Klašić 25:21. Two more distinguished citizens, Miho Marini and Antun Trifoni, members of the St. Anthony fraternity, also petitioned, but were rejected (23:23 and 28:18).

<sup>53</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 44, ff. 211-212. The decision received the majority vote of 48 to 2.

The admission of new members seemed to have lost in rhythm in the years which followed, and the already voted out decision on the aggregation of two extra families, plus the original ten, never came into effect. In 1668 two foreign families were admitted. On June 27, 1668, Marquis Anibale Poroni was accorded patrician status, and on November 26, Paolo, Francesco, Gian Carlo, and Ottavio Pierizzi, brothers and sons of the late Pietro Pierizzi of Bologna soon followed, agreeing to buy real estate in Dubrovnik.<sup>54</sup> After a gap of two years, three new domestic families were ennobled. With a vote 28 for to 24 against on the Major Council, on June 6, 1670, the noble title was conferred upon Benedikt Marinetti Primi, who gave his assurance to pay 1,000 ducats. Under the same conditions, with a minimum overvote of 21 to 20, Bernard Giorgi, member of a citizen branch of the Giorgi patrician family was also admitted. There is no evidence of the fund paid or the eventual merits of Mitar Seratura, who was admitted during the same session with a vote of 27 for to 25 against.<sup>55</sup> Andrija Paoli was introduced into the patrician circle on the Major Council session held on August 28, 1670, the vote being 27 to 21. He promised to contribute a sum of 1,500 ducats, drawn from his wife's dowry and deposited at a bank in Naples.<sup>56</sup> Eight years passed before the admission of the last candidate took place. On June 25, 1678, with a close vote of 33 to 32, Petar Vodopić, was accorded patrician status.<sup>57</sup>

The controversies over the admission of the new nobles did not disappear from the political agenda. Although no specific entries on the subject can be traced in the council's records before 1696, the decisions of the Major Council dated February 13 of the same year confirm that the aggregation issue had remained open until the date. These decisions put a final stop to permeability. Namely, all the former decisions concerning the admission of the new nobles had been annulled, and the issue could be brought back on the agenda only by the positive vote of two thirds of the members on all the three councils. Since then, the same majority of two thirds was required for every decision concerning the aggregation of the nobility.<sup>58</sup> The provisions of

<sup>54</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 44, ff. 256rv (28:19); vol. 45, f. 7rv (30:22).

<sup>55</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 45, ff. 58v-61.

<sup>56</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 45, f. 77rv.

<sup>57</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 47, ff. 129v-130.

<sup>58</sup> *Acta Maioris Consilii*, vol. 50, ff. 260v-261v.



1696 prove that a strong anti-aggregation faction took the lead among the patricians.

#### 8. *The Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists: endogamy within endogamy*

The number of decisions and votings most directly shows that the admission of the new nobility had always been a thorny issue. Although patriciate's political will in favour of the aggregation was not as sincere, the results of the voting demonstrate that the majority believed that the solutions offered were the only way out of biological extinction. However, the consolidation of the class, as a declared goal of the aggregation, was not attained. None of the members of the Barberini, Poroni and Pierizzi families ever moved to Dubrovnik nor did they participate in the government. Moreover, most of the newly ennobled families soon died off: Sorgo-Bobali in 1736, Giorgi-Bernardo in 1737 with the death of the poet Nikola (Ignjat), Clasci in 1791, and Paoli in 1800. Only three of the new noble families lived to see the fall of the Republic: the Bosdari, Natali, and Zlatarić.

Not only did the action for the revitalization of the patrician class fail but it gave way to an unbridgeable rift within the rank. Although the old and the new nobles were officially equal before the law,<sup>59</sup> everyday political practice diverged greatly from the declared principle.<sup>60</sup> Since the 1690s, actually three

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<sup>59</sup> According to all the cited decisions concerning aggregation, the new nobility was to enjoy each and every privilege of the Ragusan patriciate. In 1671 the Senate rejected the proposal for the noblewomen of older families to be given the right to have better seats (probably in church or theatre). In 1675 Frano Gozze stated clearly in his will that in case his daughter married a "new" or *aggregato*, as he put it, she would be disinherited. This pejorative term spurred the Senate to have Gozze's sentence reworded by replacing *aggregato* with a syntagm "not of the old houses". Milan Rešetar, »Salamankezi i Sorbonezi«. *Dubrovački list* 2/19 (1925): p. 1. In the official description of the patrician prerogatives, drafted by the Republic's secretary on June 25, 1795, the class equality is explicitly stated. *Fedi ed Attestati*, vol. 8, f. 96. ("Che nella Nobiltà della Nostra Repubblica di Ragusa non vi sono classi.")

<sup>60</sup> Žarko Muljačić has come forward with a hypothesis on the considerable formalization of the differences between the patricians. In favour of his argument, Muljačić refers to a Salamancanist Tomo Bassegli and his certificate of citizenship from 1783. The document reads that Bassegli is "*Senatorii ordinis vir*", implying the existence of nobles unworthy of senatorial position (Ž. Muljačić, »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: p. 25). Such a formulation, however, has no legal ground in any of the councils' decisions, and the fact that the members of the newly admitted families were not elected in the Senate before the 1780s is merely the result of oligarchic relations and outvote, since the electoral system suited the coterie which held majority in the Senate. Furthermore, certificates such as Bassegli's were issued for use outside the Republic and were often "embellished" with an affirmative detail or two.

patrician groups were on the scene. The newly ennobled men were restricted access to all the high offices of the state, and in the political sense they de facto represented the second-class aristocracy. Some of the old patricians (the Sorbonnists), who sided with the new through marriage ties, represented a genuine political subject and as such could not have been excluded from the holding of government office. The remaining majority of the old patriciate (the Salamancanists) remained loyal to endogamy from the time before the aggregation, deciding to further restrict its mating practice by excluding the old nobles who had accepted the new ones by their marriage arrangements (Table 3).<sup>61</sup>

Table 3. Division among the patriciate

Old		New	
<i>Salamankezi</i>		<i>Sorbonezi</i>	

A modest number of the aggregated families demonstrate that they themselves could not have been in the position to cause an unbridgeable inner-

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<sup>61</sup> The French consul Le Maire reports in 1776 on the aggregation and genesis of the patrician rift after the earthquake. Devoid of details on the social and political background of the events, Le Maire's report tends to present the whole process in a somewhat shambolic light: "When the patricians realized how few they were, they considered it prudent to allow several nonnoble families into their rank. They chose the wealthiest and the most distinguished among those spared by the earthquake. Additionally, they allowed marriages between noble and nonnoble families. Such an innovation, proven necessary in the given circumstances, had become the source of considerable abuse and feud in earnest. When some of the noblemen acting in conformity with the new regulation married down by taking women from the new nobility or the citizen class, those who had not yet married accordingly changed their mind. The patricians were no longer allowed to marry the lower ranks. They looked down on the new nobility and their affines. Then a tripartite differentiation was introduced among the nobility: the old, the new, and the middle." Le Maire also wrote that "the old" were meticulously observant in how "pure blooded" the members of "the new" were. Thus according to the degree and the number of affinal relations with the aggregates and their offspring, there existed numerous subgroups of "the new", which further encouraged the inner-class rift (»O Dubrovniku i Dubrovčanima 1776. - André Alexandre Le Maire«, *Dubrovnik* 6 (1974): p. 28).

class rift within the aristocracy at the close of the 17th century.<sup>62</sup> No doubt the reasons behind the breakup should be sought in different political positions and attitudes within the old patriciate itself in the period before the process of aggregation, as mentioned earlier in the article. It may also be assumed that the conflict had its roots back in the Great Conspiracy days. Future genealogical analysis would most certainly confirm that the number of marriages between the members of the rival groups soon started to decrease, while the patricians from the “grey area” through marriage policy opted for either of the factions. For after the earthquake (and probably already before it), the “grey area” no more existed, as each patrician had definitely taken sides.

Although the aggregation as a measure of class consolidation was the first issue which aroused bitter tensions between the conservative and a more liberal faction and among each of them, the discussion eventually concentrated on a somewhat higher level around a dilemma of whether or not the aggregation will help save the Ragusan patrician rank from extinction. If a minimum consensus had not been reached, the decision in favour of aggregation and other subsequent decisions pertaining to the admission of new nobles would never have been brought, because the group which later advocated for the “pure blood” criterion dominated by the majority of two-thirds. Thus their consent was essential for the passing of the decisions.

It was after the aggregation of the new nobility that the events took an unexpected turn. The numerically superior group, thanks to which the decisions on aggregation were passed, shifts the position and decides to ignore its own decisions in practice. Unable to change them, they could still distance from them. But, to keep distance from the new nobility was only a secondary motive. The main aim, which proved essential and key to the whole story, was to distinguish clearly from the old nobility which accepted the new nobles. As the minority noble group saw in the new nobility a chance of its own promotion and strengthening in terms of numerical growth, it unconditionally accepted the new patricians. The dominant group, however, having

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<sup>62</sup> The authors who have examined this problem observed that the “new” faction increased through marriages with the “old” families, because the latter, according to the “blood” criterion, automatically acquired the status of “the new”. See: Ž. Muljačić, »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: pp. 25-40; Ž. Muljačić, »Salamankezi i sorbonezi u Dubrovniku«: pp. 161-173; Ž. Muljačić, »Istraga protiv jakobinaca 1797. god. u Dubrovniku«: pp. 235-252.

realized that by voting in favour of aggregation it voted against itself, came forward with a “pure blood” theory, which introduced the criteria for establishing aristocratic pedigree. The “pure blood” thesis has no genuine ideological background, being merely a pragmatic attempt to correct one’s own mistake, a last-ditch effort of the Salamancanists to secure their dominant position. Such a course of events casts a new light on the first post-earthquake period as well. In the general atmosphere of hopelessness, a murderer and a problematic character such as Marojica Caboga, a Sorbonnist partisan, proved himself a praiseworthy Ragusan hero, with the result that his stature as well as his influence on the new nobility irritated the adherents of the dominant faction.

Thus it was the admission of the new that marked a definite class division. On the one hand, the split manifested as an acceptance of the new members as equals, inter-marriage with them, and on the other, as their rejection, isolation and “pure blood” ideology. The initial phase of the rift took a rapid course, mainly during the first generation after the aggregation. The rigid and merciless “blood” division pushed the original ideological disagreements out of the limelight, while the members of both groups showed differences in opinion generated by the change on the political scene. The “blood” division encapsulated the outcome of the earlier family feuds caused by personal and political differences among the patriciate. From then until the fall of the Republic, the Salamancanist-Sorbonnist division functioned as a pattern in all the inner-class relations and conflicts.

The key to understanding of the rift may be established genealogically by analyzing the marriage ties between the members of the Ragusan patrician families. On the basis of genealogical analysis of 232 patrician marriages in the period between the earthquake of 1667 and the fall of the Republic in 1808,<sup>63</sup> and the only complete list of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists compiled by Inocent Čulić in 1817,<sup>64</sup> we have been able to establish with

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<sup>63</sup> The analysis is based on the genealogies reconstructed from the registers of the baptized (K) and married (V) of the City parish (Dubrovnik): *G5K* (1671-1687); *G6K* (1688-1705); *G7K* (1706-1711); *G8K* (1711-1728); *G9K* (1729-1758); *G10K* (1758-1798); *G11K* (1799-1812); *G3V* (1706-1722); *G4V* (1722-1728); *G5V* (1729-1778); *G6V* (1778-1821) (SAD).

<sup>64</sup> The list is taken from the report on the Ragusan patriciate, the author of which was a notorious Austrian confidant, fra Inocent Čulić (1782-1852), *Miscellanea*, vol. 23, position 16.1.46 (State Archives of Zadar).

exactitude the existence of two distinct groups. Although recent research has not yet dated the origin of the terms Salamancanist and Sorbonnist (the first record of the names dates from the second half of the 18th century), we shall employ these group references for the entire period from the aggregation until the fall of the Republic. While the Salamancanists were composed of the members of the old patriciate only, the Sorbonnists may be divided into two subgroups: the old and the new nobility (see Table 3).

Table 4. Patrician families and their branches by participation in the Salamancanist or Sorbonnist faction (1667-1808).

Legend:


Salamancanists



Sorbonnists - old nobility



Sorbonnists - new nobility



Source: Patrician genealogical tables reconstructed on the basis of Dubrovnik parish registers.

Family	Branch	1670	1690	1710	1730	1750	1770	1790	1808	Date of extinction
SEGLI	Marko son of Toma (*c. 1635)									1806
	Dominik (*c. 1615)									end of 17 <sup>th</sup> century
JESSA	Danijan son of Jakov (*c. 1655)									1771 (1814)
	Frano (*c. 1615)									end of 17 <sup>th</sup> century
BALI	Ivan son of Serafin (1598-1658)									1778 (1806)
								Ivan son of Ivan-Nikola (1714-1795), 1760		1795 (1806)
NA	Marin son of Marin (c. 1662-1729)									1762
	Nikola son of Frano (*c. 1625)									1769 (1795)
	Luka son of Frano (*c. 1630)									survived until the 20 <sup>th</sup> c.
	Mato son of Marin (1637-1708)									survived until the 20 <sup>th</sup> c.
NDA	Vladislav son of Marin (*c. 1660)									second quarter of the 18 <sup>th</sup> c.
	Marin son of Jeronim (*c. 1620)									1757 (1764)
SDARI	Vlaho son of Miho (*c. 1635)									1846
										1807
CCHIA	Sekondo son of Nikola (*c. 1605)									1760
								Maro son of Marin (1682-1760), 1725		
3 OGA	Serafin son of Kristofan (*c. 1620)									end of 17 <sup>th</sup> century
	Bernard son of Marin (1671-1753)									emigrated, end of 19 <sup>th</sup> c.
RVA	Junije son of Gabrijel (*c. 1635)									1813
	Martolica (*c. 1600)									emigrated, end of 19 <sup>th</sup> c.





Family	Branch	1670	1690	1710	1730	1750	1770	1790	1808	Date of extinction
GRADI	Junije son of Mato (1622-1667)									1783 (1796)
	Frano son of Šiško (c. 1650-1740)									1911
MENZE	Nikola son of Vladislav (c. 1666- 1726)									1759 (1806)
	Jeronim son of Jeronim(*c.1635)									1783
NATALI	Klement son of Ivan (c. 1641-1719)									1854
PALMOTA	Jakov son of Mato (* c. 1600)									1895 (1897)
PAULI	Džore (*c. 1610)									end of 17 <sup>th</sup> century
	Andrija son of Ivan-Petar (*c. 1630)									1792 (1800)
POZZA	Lucijan (*c. 1615)					POZZA-SORGO Lucijan son of Nikola (1735-1813)				survived until the 20 <sup>th</sup> c.
	Frano son of Pavao (*c.1630)									beginning of 18 <sup>th</sup> century
	Junije son of Marko (c. 1657-1723)									1723 (1729)
PRIMI-MARINETTI	Frano son of Džore (c. 1652-1715)									1715 (1722)
	Benedikt (*c. 1615)									end of 17 <sup>th</sup> century
	Stjepan son of Božo (c. 1654-1708)									1782
RAGNINA	Frano son of Sabo (*c. 1635)									1818 (1840)
		Junije son of Sabo (1723-1772), 1765								1772 (1773)



Although the division bears an accentuated agnatic distinction, the surname, however, does not feature as a distinctive element. One should have in mind that in the period investigated Ragusan patrician families had centuries-old histories behind them. Numerous cross-marriages contributed to the closer knitting of the patrician network and the same surname no longer stood in relevant correlation with the degree of kinship. That is why we find patricians who share the same surname, but are distributed in both groups. As a rule, smaller families belong to only one group, that of the Salamancanists — Bassegli (1 family), Benessa (1), Bonda (1), Buća (2), Giorgi-Bona (1), Gradi (2), Ragnina (1), Resti (1), and Tudisi (2), while Gondola (1), Palmotta (1), Proculo (1), and Saraca (1) belonged to the rival Sorbonnist group. The rest, larger patrician families, have branches in both groupings: Gozze (8 branches belonged to the Salamancanist group and one to that of the Sorbonnists), Sorgo (5:2), Bona (3:3), Pozza (2:1), Zamagna (2:1), Ghetaldi (2:1), Menze (1:2), Bobali (1:1), Caboga (1:1), and Cerva (1:1). All the members of the new nobility, naturally, supported the Sorbonnist group (Bosdari, Clasci, Giorgi, Natali, Paoli, Sorgo-Bobali, and Zlatarić).

The marriage analysis undoubtedly confirms the existence of two separate endogamous systems. Out of 232 marriages between 1667 and 1808, as many as 217 (93.53%) were within the same group (Table 5; the blue rectangle stands for marriages among the Salamancanists, while the pink-yellow rectangle stands for those among the Sorbonnists). The Salamancanist group had 126 in-marriages (54.31%), and the Sorbonnists 91 (39.22%). There were only 15 cross-marriages (6.47%): 8 marriages have been recorded between a male Salamancanist and a female Sorbonnist (3.45%), while a male Sorbonnist married a Salamancanist bride 7 times (2.16%) (Table 6, Graph 2).

Table 5. Marriages between patrician families (1667-1808)

Source: Patrician genealogical tables reconstructed on the basis of Dubrovnik parish registers






Table 6. Marriages by the patrician groupings

Patrician grouping	Marriages	
	Number	%
<i>Total</i>	232	100
Salamancanist (m) - Salamancanist (f)	126	54.31
Sorbonnist (m) - Sorbonnist (f)	91	39.22
Salamancanist (m) - Sorbonnist (f)	8	3.45
Sorbonnist (m) - Salamancanist (f)	7	3.02

Graph 2. Marriages by the patrician groupings



Not a single exception has been recorded with marriages of the new nobility: bride or bridegroom stemmed from the Sorbonnist circle. Twenty-eight (87.5%) out of 32 marriages involved a member of the new nobility and a Sorbonnist. In the remaining 4 marriages both spouses belonged to the new nobility (Table 7). This data is an excellent proof of the “pure blood” principle operating as a precondition of the participation in the Salamancanist circle.

Table 7. Marriages between the old and new Ragusan patricians

Patrician grouping	Marriages	
	Number	%
<i>Total</i>	32	100
Salamancanist (m) - Sorbonnist (f, new nobility)	0	0.00
Sorbonnist (m, new nobility) - Salamancanist (f)	0	0.00
Sorbonnist (m, old nobility) - Sorbonnist (f, new nobility)	16	50.00
Sorbonnist (m, new nobility) - Sorbonnist (f, old nobility)	12	37.50
Sorbonnist (m, new nobility) - Sorbonnist (f, new nobility)	4	12.50

According to Muljačić, a Salamancanist groom who married a Sorbonnist bride “did not *ipso facto* become a Sorbonnist by blood, as would his children...”.<sup>65</sup> The idea underlying this interpretation clearly rests upon the principle of “pure bloodline”: the bridegroom is of pure descent because both his parents are pure-blooded, but his children are not since their mother is a Sorbonnist. The Salamancanist-Sorbonnist division, however, rests upon political differences as well. A Salamancanist groom who married a Sorbonnist bride accepted the “Sorbonnist principle” and the fact that his children would draw on the Sorbonnist lineage. Viewed politically, he is a Sorbonnist and

<sup>65</sup> “According to the Ragusan understanding” are Muljačić’s exact words, for which he fails to provide a source (Ž. Muljačić, »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: p. 26).

not a Salamancanist.<sup>66</sup>

By marrying a Sorbonnist bride, a Salamancanist groom is subject to conversion from a Salamancanist to a Sorbonnist. In 7 out of 8 marriages of the kind conversion took place, and only once, despite his marriage with a Sorbonnist bride, was (most likely) a Salamancanist bridegroom to retain his original group identity.<sup>67</sup> Vice-versa, a Sorbonnist was never to become a Salamancanist by marrying a Salamancanist bride, which demonstrates the conservative attitude of the group in that “impure blood” cannot be “purified”. Marriages between a Sorbonnist bridegroom and a Salamancanist bride are probably due to a specific set of circumstances as the one we have been able to trace between a Sorgo Sorbonnist bridegroom and a Gozze Salamancanist bride. Melhior Gozze (1747-1787), a Salamancanist, committed suicide in Luka Šipanska on October 14, 1787.<sup>68</sup> In less than three months, on January 11, 1788, his widow remarried a Sorbonnist, Mato Sorgo. Her minor daughter from the marriage with Melhior, a Salamancanist, brought up in a Sorbonnist household of her step-father, married the latter’s brother, Marin Sorgo, also a Sorbonnist, in 1802. Therefore, according to her patrilineal origin, she was a Salamancanist, but being bred in a Sorbonnist environment, she could not have but married a Sorbonnist.

At the time of the aggregation of the new nobility in the post-earthquake period, the Salamancanists considerably outnumbered their opponents. An overall perspective of the period between 1667 and the fall of the Republic in 1808 shows that they were a stronger group. Two-hundred and sixty-seven (57.54%) young couples belong to the Salamancanist group, while 197 (42.46%) to that of the Sorbonnists. Among the latter, however, 161 (34.70%) belonged to the old nobility, and 36 (7.76%) to the new aristocracy. The ratio in favour of the Salamancanists proved much higher in the beginning. The change in

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<sup>66</sup> Muljačić falsely asserts that by the end of the eighteenth century when the Sorbonnist faction acquired the majority, there were cases of newly recruited Sorbonnists “because his wife or kin were of the kind”. Muljačić provides evidence on the brothers Božo-Marija and Dživo-Luigi Ghetaldi who entered the Major Council in 1786-1787 (Ž. Muljačić, »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: p. 27, note 9). The mentioned brothers, however, belong to the Ghetaldi branch which had already grouped with the Sorbonnist in the seventeenth century (see Table 4).

<sup>67</sup> Junije Ragnina (1723-1772), a Salamancanist, married on November 3, 1765 a Sorbonnist Nika, daughter of Luko Bona (1747-1818). Although there is no reliable evidence to support his Salamancanist identity in marriage, as they had no offspring, the fact that the wife remarried a Salamancanist from the Sorgo family in 1773 may be indicative.

<sup>68</sup> “...occisus ex se ipso in venatione, cuius corpus sequenti die inventum est in silva in loco vulgo dicto visce Lucize...” (*LŠ6M*, Parish Archives of Luka Šipanska).



Table 8. Salamancanists and Sorbonnists in 1817

Patrician family	Total	Salamancanists	Sorbonnists
<i>Number of patricians</i>	225	84	141
%	100	37.33	62.67
Bona	12		12
Bonda	5	5	
Bosdari	4		4
Caboga	9		9
Cerva	4		4
Ghetaldi	19		19
Giorgi	15	15	
Giorgi-Bona	5	5	
Gozze	30	19	11
Gradi	5	5	
Menze	4		4
Natali	14		14
Pozza	19	19	
Ragnina	3	3	
Saraca	13		13
Sorgo	41	12	29
Sorgo-Cerva	6		6
Tudisi	1	1	
Zamagna	15		15
Zlatarić	1		1

Sources: Report of fra Inocent Čulić, *Miscellanea*, vol. 23, pos. 16.1.46 (State Archives in Zadar); Census of the City of Dubrovnik, 1817, F. IV, 114 (State Archives in Dubrovnik).

ratio took place later because the “pure blood” principle worked on behalf of the Sorbonnists and increased their number, and reversely, reduced the number of their opponents. According to the census of 1817, the Sorbonnists outnumbered the Salamancanists by 62.67% to 37.33% (Table 8). Although the number of converted marriages was rather low, merely 7, out of which only 3 with off-spring, their influence on the power balance, if a modest size of the group, was essential. In 1817, the participation of the spouses from the “mixed” marriages in the overall number of marriages was 16%, implying that the Salamancanist group may still overrate the Sorbonnists (53.33%) had the marriage conversions taken place (Table 9, Graph 3).<sup>69</sup> There were four cases of conversion. The first, when two Ghetaldi brothers, Dominik (1677-1746) and Frano (1682-1754), married in 1703/4 the two sisters of the short-lived Sorbonnist branch of the Pozza, thus taking upon themselves the Sorbonnist identity.<sup>70</sup> Mato Bucchia (1682-1760) became a Sorbonnist by marrying a Sorbonnist noblewoman from the Sorgo family in 1725. On the same day, August 31, 1760, Ivan Bona (1710-1795) and Nikola Sorgo (1717-1790) married two sisters, daughters of a Sorbonnist Mato Zamagna. The last cases took place on November 3, 1765, when Junije Ragnina (1723-1772) and Nikola Gozze (1727-1799) married the daughters of a Sorbonnist, Luko Bona.

A slight fall in the number of the Salamancanists and a rise of the Sorbonnists can be traced from the membership of the Major Council. The participation of the Sorbonnists was below 40% in the 1760s, but it shows a continuous increase by exceeding 50% in 1771, and reaching 56.82% at the turn of the century (Table 10, Graph 4).<sup>71</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Thus Muljačić erroneously concludes that the Sorbonnist families had a higher birth rate and a greater number of male infants (Ž. Muljačić, »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: p. 29).

<sup>70</sup> Misguided by Kata Bassegli's letter from 1781, Žarko Muljačić concludes that it was then that the Ghetaldi family joined the Sorbonnists: “... l'altra fazione si occupa a far reclute facendo nuovi sposalizij: i Getaldi miei vicini tutti due si sono sposati...” (Ž. Muljačić, »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: p. 34, note 29). But the words of Kata Bassegli should not be interpreted in the sense that the Ghetaldi then joined the Sorbonnists, but as her own commentary on their reproductive strategy in that marriage was the means of securing their lineage and increasing the Sorbonnist circle.

<sup>71</sup> A similar statistic has been provided by Žarko Muljačić, but his ratio of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists differs markedly in favour of the former, probably because he failed to identify the Saraca and the Proculo as Sorbonnist families. He also failed to discern that the Ghetaldi joined the Sorbonnists much earlier. Some families which had members in both factions Muljačić decided to group as Salamancanists only. Thus, according to Muljačić, it was not until 1796 that the Sorbonnists outnumbered the Salamancanists (Ž. Muljačić, »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: pp. 28-29).

Table 9. The structure of the Salamancanists and Sorbonnists by the census of 1817

			Total	Old nobility	Converts from the 18th c.	New nobility
Number of members in 1817	225	84	141	86	36	19
%	100	37.33	62.67	38.22	16.00	8.44

Graph 3. The structure of the Salamancanists and Sorbonnists by the census of 1817





Table 10. Members of the Major Council by coterie affiliation (1751-1807)

Year	Members of Major Council	Salmancanists				Sorbonnists					
		Total	18-44	45 and more	Share (%)	Total	18-44	45 and more	Share (%)	New nobility	Share (%)
1751-1807.	5588	2782	1230	1552	49.79	2806	1451	1355	50.21	502	8.98
1751	127	74	42	32	58.27	53	24	29	41.73	14	11.02
1752	129	76	42	34	58.91	53	24	29	41.09	14	10.85
1753	127	76	41	35	59.84	51	22	29	40.16	14	11.02
1754	125	75	36	39	60.00	50	23	27	40.00	14	11.20
1755	123	74	35	39	60.16	49	23	26	39.84	13	10.57
1756	120	72	35	37	60.00	48	22	26	40.00	13	10.83
1757	119	71	34	37	59.66	48	22	26	40.34	12	10.08
1758	117	67	34	33	57.27	50	23	27	42.74	12	10.26
1759	117	67	32	35	57.27	50	24	26	42.74	13	11.11
1760	117	64	31	33	54.70	53	26	27	45.30	13	11.11
1761	119	64	28	36	53.78	55	27	28	46.22	12	10.08
1762	119	64	26	38	53.78	55	24	31	46.22	12	10.08
1763	117	64	27	37	54.70	53	24	29	45.30	12	10.26
1764	119	65	28	37	54.62	54	26	28	45.38	12	10.08
1765	122	64	23	41	52.46	58	29	29	47.54	12	9.84
1766	119	62	22	40	52.10	57	30	27	47.90	11	9.24
1767	117	61	20	41	52.14	56	30	26	47.86	11	9.40
1768	115	59	18	41	51.30	56	29	27	48.70	11	9.57
1769	109	56	18	38	51.38	53	27	26	48.62	9	8.26
1770	109	55	17	38	50.46	54	28	26	49.54	9	8.26
1771	107	53	16	37	49.53	54	28	26	50.47	9	8.41
1772	96	46	14	32	47.92	50	25	25	52.08	8	8.33
1773	93	44	14	30	47.31	49	25	24	52.69	8	8.60
1774	90	43	15	28	47.78	47	23	24	52.22	7	7.78
1775	88	42	15	27	47.73	46	22	24	52.27	7	7.95
1776	87	41	15	26	47.13	46	22	24	52.87	7	8.05
1777	86	41	16	25	47.67	45	22	23	52.33	7	8.14
1778	85	40	16	24	47.06	45	21	24	52.94	6	7.06
1779	83	39	16	23	46.99	44	22	22	53.01	6	7.23

Year	Members of Major Council	Salmancanists				Sorbonnists					
		Total	18-44	45 and more	Share (%)	Total	18-44	45 and more	Share (%)	New nobility	Share (%)
1751-1807.	5588	2782	1230	1552	49.79	2806	1451	1355	50.21	502	8.98
1780	83	38	15	23	45.78	45	23	22	54.22	6	7.23
1781	85	39	16	23	45.88	46	24	22	54.12	6	7.06
1782	85	39	15	24	45.88	46	22	24	54.12	6	7.06
1783	84	39	15	24	46.43	45	22	23	53.57	6	7.14
1784	82	39	14	25	47.56	43	21	22	52.44	5	6.10
1785	81	39	14	25	48.15	42	19	23	51.85	5	6.17
1786	81	39	13	26	48.15	42	20	22	51.85	6	7.41
1787	84	40	14	26	47.62	44	22	22	52.38	6	7.14
1788	81	37	13	24	45.68	44	20	24	54.32	6	7.41
1789	80	36	12	24	45.00	44	20	24	55.00	6	7.50
1790	79	34	11	23	43.04	45	22	23	56.96	7	8.86
1791	76	34	12	22	44.74	42	19	23	55.26	7	9.21
1792	78	35	14	21	44.87	43	20	23	55.13	8	10.26
1793	78	35	15	20	44.87	43	20	23	55.13	8	10.26
1794	85	39	19	20	45.88	46	22	24	54.12	8	9.41
1795	84	37	18	19	44.05	47	23	24	55.95	8	9.52
1796	87	38	20	18	43.68	49	26	23	56.32	9	10.34
1797	85	36	20	16	42.35	49	25	24	57.65	9	10.59
1798	92	40	24	16	43.48	52	28	24	56.52	9	9.78
1799	88	38	24	14	43.18	50	30	20	56.82	9	10.23
1800	88	38	23	15	43.18	50	32	18	56.82	8	9.09
1801	89	38	23	15	42.70	51	34	17	57.30	8	8.99
1802	91	38	23	15	41.76	53	36	17	58.24	7	7.69
1803	89	38	23	15	42.70	51	35	16	57.30	7	7.87
1804	90	39	23	16	43.33	51	36	15	56.67	6	6.67
1805	94	41	25	16	43.62	53	38	15	56.38	6	6.38
1806	94	40	23	17	42.55	54	37	17	57.45	6	6.38
1807	94	40	23	17	42.55	54	38	16	57.45	6	6.38

Sources for tables 10-13: *Specchio del Maggior Consiglio*, ser. 21.1, vol. 4 and 5.

Graph 4. Members of the Major Council by coterie affiliation (1751-1807)



#### *9. The political definition of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists in the 18th century*

By the end of the 17th century the original division into the counter-Ottoman and the pragmatic group from the time of the Great Conspiracy experienced a gradual change. At the time of the aggregation of the new nobility the rift, in the strict sense, featured largely along the biological line, overshadowing its political aspect.

Apart from determining principal distinctions, accurate political characterization of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists proves unattainable. Although politically rooted, the rift started losing its original ideological character on the internal political scene and turned into an unscrupulous struggle for power between the two agnatic groupings. A complex difference of opinion concerning foreign policy issues maintained though in a consider-

ably modified form in conformity with the change of the political relations in south-east Europe and the Mediterranean. We might be under an impression that the ideologically raw political positions of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists were guided by personal ambition of the leading members of certain *casate*. That is why it is impossible to draw an accurate political portrait of the two groups. It seems that the notion of an agnatically-based political coterie includes the basic elements of the social and political functioning of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists.<sup>72</sup> Narrow family interests were to dominate over the political and ideological differences between the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists. Thus, in line with Žarko Muljačić's argument, a definition of the "new" (the Sorbonnists) as politically liberal and progressive and the "old" (the Salamancanists) as politically reactionary and conservative, a stereotyped approach commonly found in literature, may be misleading.

#### *10. The result of the rift: a new political paradigm*

Most of the mesalliances involving the old and the new nobility date from the period immediately after the aggregation, but during the 18th century the conflict tended to unfold as a complex political process which introduced essential changes into the centuries-long institutional practice of Dubrovnik. A new political paradigm was based on unscrupulous inner-class power struggle, which inevitably led towards a disintegration of the political system. Although he failed to provide an acceptable definition of the new patrician groups, the historian Kosto Vojnović made an excellent attempt to evaluate the significance and the aftermath of this phase of the rift: "Thus the ancient principle of equality of all patrician families, upon which the Republic rested over eight centuries, gave way to oligarchy. Because the new patricians were restricted from holding rector's office and at first from sitting on the Senate as well... In that way the city was divided into two rival groups of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists, hostile and animus against each

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<sup>72</sup> The term *patrician agnatic group* is much too general and inaccurate, while the term *party*, found in some works, denotes a modern political organization. Apart from the notion of party, Lujo Vojnović tends to use the term *consorterija* (»Salamankezi i sorbonezi«, *Dubrovački list* 2/22 (1925): pp. 2-3), equally employed by Žarko Muljačić, although the latter decided on the term "party" in one of his titles (»O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«). The notion *coterie* puts a stress on the "blood" criterion, covering also the unstable political area of conflicting interests, as well as the fact that the activity of these groups lacked any form of legal framework.

other. This dualism was the seed of the rivalry, seemingly dormant, which would sooner or later bring poisonous fruit.”<sup>73</sup>

The form of the decisions of the Ragusan councils and the silence of the official sources from the first decades after the aggregation limit our survey into the political consequences of the “blood” rift.<sup>74</sup> Despite fairly sparse sources, certain evidence of more recent date confirms that the old nobility grouping, which tended to inter-marry with the aggregates, operated from the very beginning as a separate, Sorbonnist group, as opposed to the “pure-blooded” Salamancanist group. But the consequences of the clear-cut demarcation between the two endogamous groups may not be traced on the political perspective before the close of the 1750s. It was then, during the political ferment among the patriciate, that the “new” and the “old” are being mentioned.<sup>75</sup> Although the first source reference to “the Salamancanists” and “the Sorbonnists” dates from mid-1770s,<sup>76</sup> we can assume that the terms must

<sup>73</sup> Kosto Vojnović, »Sudbeni ustroj republike dubrovačke«, *Rad JAZU* 115 (1893): p. 3.

<sup>74</sup> Discussions on the councils were not recorded and in formulating the final decisions the Ragusan political elite tended to misrepresent the conflict and animosity among the members. Administrative brevity of the conclusions conceals political dynamics in that the relations between the factions and eventual political positions of the individuals and groups on the councils can only be gleaned from the voting results. Reading between the lines, one can hardly grasp the crisis proportions of 1763 and 1781, on which other sources testify as serious political and agnatic divisions.

<sup>75</sup> Although Herculès, a French merchant in Dubrovnik, mentions a “pro-French and counter-French party” in the City as early as in 1758, the first explicit reference to the political conflict of “the new” and “the old” was made by the French consul Le Maire in his report of February 12, 1763, in which he described the course of a several-months’ conflict among the patricians. See: Vjekoslav Jelavić, »O dubrovačko-franceskim odnosima u god. 1756.-1776.«, *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja u Bosni i Hercegovini* 16 (1906): pp. 518, 523-525.

<sup>76</sup> To date, no evidence on the usage of the terms *salamankezi* or *sorbonezi* in the official state papers can be traced. The first record pointing to the patrician groups being named after Salamanca and Sorbonne was made by an anonym in the service of Maria Theresa during his visit to Dalmatia and Dubrovnik in 1774 and 1775. On different names of the patrician groups, the report reads: “I primi sono indicati dicendoli di Salamanca; gli altri i Sorbona”. (Maja Novak Sambrailo, »Politika Dubrovčana«, *Starine JAZU* 55 (1971): p. 161). The syntagm *partito dei sorbonezi* Muljačić has located in a private document. It was in the letter of Kata Bassegli (a Salamancanist) addressed to her son Tomo on May 4, 1781. In another letter of June 16, 1784, she refers to her own group as *nostro partito*. Attributive use of the term Salamancanist has been found in a letter of Alberto Fortis addressed to Miho Sorgo on June 23, 1785. Fortis describes an Italian countess keen on her ancient title as being “of Salamancanist orientation”, an expression Sorgo would be familiar with. In a letter to her niece Deša of December 9, 1786, Miho Sorgo describes a Venetian Alvisetto Mocenigo as a “wealthy Salamancanist”. Ž. Muljačić, »Salamankezi i sorbonezi u Dubrovniku«: p. 161, note 1.



have been coined earlier, probably immediately after the Great Conspiracy. The closed political system of the Republic, along with a disproportionate domination of the Salamancanist faction, are the main reasons why the historical accounts point to the agnatic division with a certain delay. With the growing rivalry between the patrician groups, the Sorbonnists' aspirations became greater, and it was then that the blood division forced itself as an issue in Dubrovnik's political practice.

The institutional organization of the Republic of Dubrovnik rested upon age-old principles of class integrity and consensus. It did not suit a new political pattern. Electoral procedure based on centuries-old tradition, according to which a majority of two-thirds was necessary for the election of all the higher-ranking offices contributed to institutional stability. As a body which created and in the main implemented the state policy, the Senate gained in importance from the 15th century on.<sup>77</sup> The Senate was a body of a dual nature: a number of senators was elected by the Major Council through the usual system of chambers, while some seats were occupied by the holders of some highest offices (rector, members of the Minor Council, and judges).<sup>78</sup> By rotating some seats on the Senate held *ex officio* and by electing new members, the Major Council partly managed to maintain the renewal of its composition. With a high degree of class homogeneity even the minimum changes on the Senate prevented the oligarchy from petrifying.<sup>79</sup>

But the appearance of two strong blocks put the efficiency of the current system to test. As the political alignment with the coteries became essential

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<sup>77</sup> Nella Lonza, »Izborni postupak Dubrovačke Republike«. *Analiz Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku* 38 (2000): pp. 46-47.

<sup>78</sup> The Senate (*Consilium Rogatorum*) was established in the early fourteenth century and consisted of 20 members. The number of members fluctuated from year to year, reaching 51 member in 1447, and 61 in 1490. The Major Council elected senators for a term of twelve months, and they could not be re-elected in the following year. The practice changed over the years and the senators stayed in change for several years. (Kosto Vojnović, »O državnom ustroju republike Dubrovačke«. *Rad JAZU* 103 (1891): pp. 54-55). As the number of the patricians dropped considerably after the 1667 earthquake, only 24 members were sitting on the Senate. New regulations were introduced to increase the membership, and in 1704 there were 36 men, in 1713, 41, and in the period between 1731 and the fall of the Republic, there were 45 members. *Liber Croceus*, ed. Branislav M. Nedeljković. [Zbornik za istoriju, jezik i književnost srpskog naroda, III.24]. Beograd: SANU, 1997: cc. 334, 357, 363, 367.

<sup>79</sup> N. Lonza, »Izborni postupak Dubrovačke Republike«: pp. 47-48; K. Vojnović, »Sudbeni ustroj republike dubrovačke«: pp. 14-21.

for the participation in government, a gradual change in the power balance tended to alter the system. The Salamancanists proved to be particularly keen on this idea as they were losing power and no longer distinctly outnumbered their rivals in that they could secure domination within the frame of the old system. Thus the struggle between coteries for the leading position on the Senate provided a series of deep institutional reforms which, from the 1750s, regulated the elections, functioning, and jurisdiction of the most important governmental bodies.<sup>80</sup>

The power shift first manifested on the largest body, the Major Council, in which the Sorbonnists were in the ascendancy (Table 10). Thus the first step the Salamancanists resorted to in order to secure their position through reform was directed towards redefinition of its functions. Their aim was to strip the Major Council of its authority and unseat the Sorbonnists from infiltrating into the Senate. The electoral reforms of 1747 and 1749 marked an essential change in the institutional frame through which the role of the Major Council in the election of the highest office-holders was formally limited, and in practice virtually abolished. According to the new electoral laws, the major magistrates (rector, members of the Minor Council, and the judges) were selected only out of the members of the Senate, and a vacant seat could only result from a member's death or his ordination.<sup>81</sup> Thus the Senate as a central political institution fully incorporated and subjected major government functions, which in the former system secured a political counter-balance. The senators, securely ensconced in their circle, took over the most important offices of the state, creating perfect ground for the "senators' oligarchy". In order to deprive the Major Council of every authority and prevent the Sorbonnists from swarming into the Senate, the last of the electoral procedures was amended: the 1749 law decreed the election of *Collegio*

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<sup>80</sup> In the period 1747-1801 more than 20 decisions were passed on the Major Council concerning the composition, electoral procedure, quorum, and the responsibilities of the Senate in decision-making. (Cf. *Liber Croceus*). In order to maintain an illusion of deep-seated traditionalism, the electoral changes were at first interpreted as temporary, but soon proved permanent. The "restoration of the old system" was evoked when there were practically no conditions for it. Cf. N. Lonza, »Izborni postupak Dubrovačke Republike«: pp. 46-47.

<sup>81</sup> The law of 1747 was adopted by a majority of 60 votes to 34, and that of 1749 was passed by a vote of 68 to 28. *Liber Croceus*: cc. 382, 387; N. Lonza, »Izborni postupak Dubrovačke Republike«: pp. 46-49.

*Nuovo*, whose members succeeded the deceased senators according to the age ordering and not election. Commenting on these institutional reforms, Nella Lonza excellently anticipated their meaning as the “Senate’s silent coup d’état”.<sup>82</sup> We may add a “Salamancanists’ silent coup d’état” because there is no doubt that the reforms were initiated and carried out by the Salamancanist majority which credited itself for scheming the Major Council into voting against its own deprivation of authority.

### *11. Oligarchy: a clash among the Salamancanists*

Through legal methods and the adjustment of the electoral system, the Salamancanist coterie succeeded in securing a long-term majority on the Senate, and with it a dominant position in the leading offices of the state (Table 11), and thus, for a certain period at least, managed to neutralize the numerical increase of the Sorbonnists. But the policy of closing their ranks proved fatal for the Salamancanists, too. Over the years, an inner circle of senators came to hold absolute power. The Salamancanists failed to evenly distribute political influence among the *casate* which resulted in numerous rivalries in the faction, to the benefit of the Sorbonnists. By the end of 1750s, a dissatisfied Salamancanist wing, ignoring the “blood” principle, tended to lean politically towards the Sorbonnist line. An open conflict followed at the end of 1762 and the beginning of 1763, leading to a four-month obstruction of the government.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> The Major Council retained the right to re-elect senators after their term of office. However, if the re-election was denied, the motion could recurrently be put forward, forcing the Council to finally elect the men. N. Lonza, »Izborni postupak Dubrovačke Republike«: p. 47, note 166.

<sup>83</sup> Brief accounts of older historiography on the “anarchy” and the conflict amongst the patricians (Gebhardi, Engel) are based on oral tradition and are generally superficial. In his interpretation of the events, Vinko Foretić has made a critical compilation of the available data in literature and the narrative sources. (V. Foretić, *Povijest Dubrovnika* II: pp. 239-247). In addition to the references cited by Foretić, for more information on the conflict see: Antoine Sorgo, *Fragments sur l’histoire politique et littéraire de l’ancienne république de Raguse et sur la langue slave*. Paris: Porthman, 1839: pp. 14-16; Stefano Skurla, *Ragusa - cenni storici*. Zagabria, 1876: pp. 22-23; K. Vojnović, »Sudbeni ustroj republike dubrovačke«: pp. 9-10; F. Serafino Razzi, *La storia di Ragusa*. Dubrovnik, 1903: p. 266 (a chronological supplement by Giuseppe Gelcich); Ž. Muljačić, »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: pp. 30-31.

Table 11. Representation of the Salamancanists and Sorbonnist on the Major and Minor Council, Senate, and among the rectors and judges by decades (1751-1807) (%)

Decade	Major Council		Minor Council		Senate		Rectors		Judges	
	Total	18-44	45 and more	Share (%)	Total	18-44	45 and more	Share (%)	New nobility	Share (%)
1751-1807	Salaman-canists	Sorbon-nists	Salaman-canists	Sorbon-nists	Salaman-canists	Sorbon-nists	Salaman-canists	Sorbon-nists	Salaman-canists	Sorbon-nists
1751 - 1807	49.79	50.21	57.51	42.49	56.77	43.23	59.32	40.68	58.57	41.43
1751 - 1760	58.64	41.36	70.59	29.41	69.32	30.68	70.83	29.17	70.00	30.00
1761 - 1770	52.70	47.30	63.38	36.62	73.01	26.99	68.64	31.36	56.82	43.18
1771 - 1780	47.55	52.45	55.70	44.30	53.99	46.01	69.17	30.83	63.83	36.17
1781 - 1790	46.35	53.65	52.05	47.95	54.35	45.65	48.33	51.67	65.91	34.09
1791 - 1800	44.00	56.00	51.85	48.15	45.82	54.19	50.00	50.00	42.86	57.14
1801 - 1807	42.75	57.25	51.85	48.15	42.33	57.67	44.58	55.42	50.00	50.00

Domestic and foreign authors of the time seem to agree on the origin and course of the 1762/3 conflict,<sup>84</sup> pointing to the office-holders from the ranks of the old nobility as to those responsible for the conflict. In the reconstruction of the events they focus on the arrogance of the Ragusan aristocracy and its government as corrupt, incompetent and burdened with prejudice, which undermined the Arcadian order of the Republic. On the other hand, all the sources agree on the disciplined and reasonable behaviour of the citizens, who, during the “anarchy”, attended to their regular city duties in a “perfectly composed” manner, although the most important governmental institutions had stopped work.

<sup>84</sup> Apart from the sources and literature cited by V. Foretić, particularly the work of V. Jela-  
vić, »O dubrovačko-franceskim odnosima«: pp. 523-525, the basis of our study hereafter are the  
following narrative sources: M. Novak Sambrailo, »Politika Dubrovčana«: pp. 159-167; »Lje-  
topis dubrovačkog kolegija (1559-1764).«, ed. Miroslav Vanino. *Vrela i prinosi* 7 (1937): pp. 156-  
157 (the author of this part of the annals is Đuro Bašić, a Ragusan Jesuit); an unfinished work of  
Ivo Natali (1775-1853), *Storia di Ragusa*, SAD, Legacy Natali RO-177 and the unpublished an-  
nals of a Ragusan Mato Bašić (1737-1813), *Collezione di notizie istoriche di Ragusa* (the original is  
kept at the Library of the Franciscan Monastery, but we have used the transcription made by  
Luko Pavlović at SAD, Legacy don Luka Pavlović, RO-167, no. 54-439.

A Ragusan annalist, Mato Bašić, gives a more thorough analysis of the reasons underlying the oligarchy. In view of the great power the Senate exercised as an institution, Bašić emphasizes the moral fall and incapacity of the nobility which proved unable to spare even the supreme government body of its ambition, interest, and hatred, acting against the ancient principle carved by the entrance to the chamber of the major Council: *Obliti privatorum publica curate* (Having forgotten your private interests, take care of public affairs). With the delay in the elections of new senators which were to follow after a certain number of vacancies, the relations on the Senate worsened. Through electoral schemes and agitation, the most powerful group on the Senate managed to elect its confidants and kin. After 1749 the electoral procedure failed to observe the age ordering of the members on the *Collegio Nuovo*. Some patricians were recurrently left out, their seats being filled with other candidates following the agnatic key. In this way, the senators' oligarchic circle increasingly gained in strength.

The leader of the oligarchic group of the old, the "tyranny" of which on the Senate started after the reforms 1747-1749, was Sabo Pozza (1698-1774). His right-hand men were the seven Sorgo brothers, called *Debi* (or *Golostrašni*, i.e. the Bare Bullies), who led a large network of agnates and partisans.<sup>85</sup> According to André Alexandre Le Maire, French consul to Dubrovnik, the members of this group came to hold all the power and for a period of fifteen years, through intrigue and corruption, decided on all the major political issues. Lust for power, violence, and greed were the qualities ascribed to the group by Le Maire, considering them enemies to the French economic and political interests. By the end of 1762, this oligarchic group of Salamancanists was rivaled by another Salamancanist faction, supported by the Sorbonnists. The leader of the latter group was a Salamancanist, Mato Gradi (1692-1771), with the support of the like-minded Salamancanists, Antun Sorgo (1693-1765), Nikola Bona (1708-1769), Rado Gozze (1693-1768), Nikola Gozze (1698-1773), Frano Ragnina (1714-1791), Marin Sorgo (1692-1761),

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<sup>85</sup> The aggressive behaviour of Sabo Pozza and the Sorgo brothers is considered to be the main cause of the conflict. In the reports on the "anarchy" and the literature available, the *Golostrašni* brothers are not cited by name, but are usually described as a violent phenomenon void of individual features. The group consisted of Vladislav (1683-1770), Luka (1685-1762), Gauge (1694-1774), Junije (1698-1767), Mato (1703-1778), Šiško (1707-1789), and Ivan (1709-1796). The eighth brother Nikola (1696-1763) was a priest, and as such could not take active part in the political life.

Table 12. *Casate* by participation in office (1751-1807)

Ranking	<i>Casata</i>	Number of offices		Senatorial term (in years)	Office in years of service			
		annual average	total		Rector	Member of Minor Council	Judge	Elected senator
	<i>Total</i>	43.61	2486	3269	681	426	251	1189
1	<i>Casata</i> SORGO NIKOLA son of LUKA (c. 1655-1720)	3.93	224	235	77	18	10	119
2	<i>Casata</i> RAGNINA FRANO son of SABO (*c. 1635)	1.96	112	119	23	21	24	44
3-4	<i>Casata</i> POZZA son of LUCIJAN (*c. 1615)	1.91	109	119	28	24	12	45
3-4	<i>Casata</i> GRADI FRANO son of ŠIŠKO (c. 1650-1740)	1.91	109	108	23	22	17	47
5	<i>Casata</i> CABOGA BERNARD son of MARIN (1671-1753)	1.74	99	109	20	15	7	57
6-7	<i>Casata</i> SARACA NIKOLA son of PAVAO (c. 1649-1712)	1.63	93	93	28	13	6	46
6-7	<i>Casata</i> ZAMAGNA MARTOLICA son of KRISTOFAN (*c. 1635)	1.63	93	106	9	21	12	51
8	<i>Casata</i> GIORGI BONA MIHO son of ANTUN (*c. 1645)	1.51	86	88	19	17	6	44
9	<i>Casata</i> MENZE KLEMENT son of IVAN (c. 1641-1719)	1.46	83	79	24	9	12	38
10	<i>Casata</i> GOZZE NIKOLA son of BOŽO (*c. 1640)	1.30	74	65	39	13	4	18
11	<i>Casata</i> GHETALDI MATO son of IVAN (c. 1665-1735)	1.26	72	103	26	11	3	32
12	<i>Casata</i> BONA IVAN son of SERAFIN (1598-1658)	1.21	69	65	26	10	5	28
13	<i>Casata</i> BONA MATO son of MARIN (1637-1708)	1.11	63	103	15	11	6	31
14	<i>Casata</i> SORGO ORSAT son of MARIN (*c. 1645)	1.09	62	80	14	7	11	30
15	<i>Casata</i> TUDISI MARIN son of FRANO (*c. 1635)	1.02	58	68	13	12	7	26
16	<i>Casata</i> SORGO NIKOLA son of VLADISLAV (1717-1790)	1.00	57	55	16	6	2	33
17	<i>Casata</i> BASSEGLI MARKO son of TOMA (*c. 1635)	0.98	56	56	13	12	1	30
18	<i>Casata</i> BUČA SEKONDO son of NIKOLA (*c. 1605)	0.96	55	57	21	12	0	22
19	<i>Casata</i> CERVA MARTOLICA (*c. 1600)	0.88	50	60	20	9	3	18
20	<i>Casata</i> PROCULO STJEPAN son of BOŽO (c. 1654-1708)	0.86	49	50	16	10	6	17
21-22	<i>Casata</i> SORGO MARIN son of LUKA (*c. 1645)	0.81	46	52	15	3	3	25
21-22	<i>Casata</i> SORGO PETAR son of FRANO (c. 1663-1728)	0.81	46	54	10	8	10	18
23	<i>Casata</i> BONA LUKA son of FRANO (*c. 1630)	0.79	45	45	12	9	8	16
24	<i>Casata</i> GOZZE IVAN son of RADO (*c. 1655)	0.77	44	55	6	10	7	21
25-26	<i>Casata</i> GRADI JUNIJE son of MATO (1622-1667)	0.75	43	33	22	8	2	11
25-26	<i>Casata</i> SORGO JUNIJE son of LUKA (*c. 1615)	0.75	43	51	6	7	9	21
27	<i>Casata</i> ZAMAGNA-CERVA MARTOLICA son of PETAR (1720-1783)	0.74	42	47	12	7	6	17


Ranking	Casata	Number of offices		Senatorial term (in years)	Office in years of service			
		annual average	total		Rector	Member of Minor Council	Judge	Elected senator
28	Casata GOZZE LUKA son of NIKOLA (*c. 1635)	0.68	39	68	9	6	5	19
29	Casata GHETALDI MATO son of FRANO (*c. 1635)	0.65	37	42	9	6	7	15
30	Casata GOZZE LUKA son of VLADISLAV (*c. 1635)	0.63	36	48	7	6	1	22
31	Casata BONA IVAN IVAN son of NIKOLA (1714-1795)	0.61	35	39	5	8	0	22
32-33	Casata BOSDARI VLAHO son of MIHO (*c. 1635)	0.53	30	62	9	7	0	14
32-33	Casata GOZZE PAVAO son of VLADISLAV (*c. 1645)	0.53	30	65	8	4	3	15
34-36	Casata POZZA-SORGO LUCIJAN son of NIKOLA (1735-1813)	0.51	29	35	5	7	2	15
34-36	Casata GOZZE RADO son of VLADISLAV (*c. 1640)	0.51	29	30	7	7	4	11
34-36	Casata GOZZE NIKOLA son of PAVAO (1727-1799)	0.51	29	28	8	4	4	13
37	Casata ZAMAGNA SABO son of SERAFIN (*c. 1620)	0.46	26	86	6	4	4	12
38	Casata GOZZE NIKOLA son of LUKA (c. 1625-before 1671)	0.44	25	46	1	2	1	21
39-40	Casata BONA NIKOLA son of FRANO (*c. 1625)	0.39	22	23	4	3	3	12
39-40	Casata SORGO IVAN son of MARKO (c. 1664-1736)	0.39	22	22	3	4	1	14
41-42	Casata RESTI JUNIJE (*c. 1600)	0.35	20	41	5	4	2	9
41-42	Casata CERVA JUNIJE son of GABRIJEL (*c. 1635)	0.35	20	32	3	3	0	14
43	Casata NATALI JAKOV son of MATO (*c. 1600)	0.35	20	49	4	2	2	12
44-45	Casata BOBALI DAMJAN son of JAKOV (*c. 1655)	0.33	19	36	3	5	5	6
44-45	Casata GHETALDI-GONDOLA FRANO-AUGUSTIN son of MATO (1743-1798)	0.33	19	20	5	3	2	9
46	Casata GIORGI BONDA ORSAT son of MIHO (1730-1789)	0.30	17	31	1	3	2	11
47	Casata TUDISI STJEPAN son of VLAHO (*c. 1640)	0.26	15	12	11	3	0	1
48	Casata ZLATARIĆ MIHO son of DOMINIK (*c. 1605)	0.23	13	50	2	2	1	8
49	Casata BUĆA MATO son of MARIN (1682-1760)	0.21	12	10	8	2	0	2
50	Casata BONDA MARIN son of JERONIM (*c. 1620)	0.19	11	13	1	4	3	3
51	Casata PAULI ANDRIJA son of IVAN-PETAR (*c. 1630)	0.14	8	104	4	2	0	2
52-53	Casata RAGNINA JUNIJE son of SABO (1723-1772)	0.02	1	5	0	0	0	1
52-53	Casata MENZE JERONIM son of IVAN (*c. 1635)	0.02	1	38	0	0	0	1
54-56	Casata CLASCI IVAN son of STJEPAN (*c. 1620)	0.00	0	4	0	0	0	0
54-56	Casata BONA MARIN son of MARIN (c. 1662-1729)	0.00	0	12	0	0	0	0
54-56	Casata GONDOLA ŠIŠKO son of IVAN (*c. 1630)	0.00	0	63	0	0	0	0



Salamancanists



Sorbonnists - old nobility



Sorbonnists - new nobility

Table 13. Ranking of *Casate* by decades (1751-1807)


Ranking 1751-1807	<i>Casata</i>	Ranking in the period					
		1751-1760	1761-1770	1771-1780	1781-1790	1791-1800	1801-1807
1	<i>Casata</i> SORGO NIKOLA son of LUKA (c. 1655-1720)	1	1	1	1	5-8	10-14
2	<i>Casata</i> RAGNINA FRANO son of SABO (*c. 1635)	11-16	12-13	2	5-6	4	6
3-4	<i>Casata</i> POZZA LUCIJAN (*c. 1615)	2	3	9	14-15	5-8	10-14
3-4	<i>Casata</i> GRADI FRANO son of ŠIŠKO (c. 1650-1740)	23-25	14-18	14-15	4	2	5
5	<i>Casata</i> CABOGA BERNARD son of MARIN (1671-1753)	23-25	19-23	12-13	2-3	9-10	4
6-7	<i>Casata</i> SARACA NIKOLA son of PAVAO (c. 1649-1712)	19-22	9-10	6-8	2-3	13	18-19
6-7	<i>Casata</i> ZAMAGNA MARTOLICA son of KRISTOFAN (*c. 1635)	28-29	36-37	27-28	9	1	1
8	<i>Casata</i> GIORGI BONA MIHO son of ANTUN (*c. 1645)	4-5	14-18	38-41	7	3	7
9	<i>Casata</i> MENZE KLEMENT son of IVAN (c. 1641-1719)	11-16	5	24-26	32-33	9-10	3
10	<i>Casata</i> GOZZE NIKOLA son of BOŽO (*c. 1640)	17-18	6-7	3	10-13	18-20	-
11	<i>Casata</i> GHETALDI MATO son of IVAN (c. 1665-1735)	19-22	24-27	4-5	8	30-33	10-14
12	<i>Casata</i> BONA IVAN son of SERAFIN (1598-1658)	3	2	12-13	-	-	-
13	<i>Casata</i> BONA MATO son of MARIN (1637-1708)	33-35	38-51	6-8	14-15	5-8	15-17
14	<i>Casata</i> SORGO ORSAT son of MARIN (*c. 1645)	28-29	19-23	11	10-13	16-17	24-26
15	<i>Casata</i> TUDISI MARIN son of FRANO (*c. 1635)	36-52	8	4-5	5-6	38-40	-
16	<i>Casata</i> SORGO NIKOLA son of VLADISLAV (1717-1790)	36-52	32-34	18	16-18	30-33	2
17	<i>Casata</i> BASSEGLI MARKO son of TOMA (*c. 1635)	36-52	28-29	19-23	23	12	10-14
18	<i>Casata</i> BUČA SEKONDO son of NIKOLA (*c. 1605)	19-22	14-18	10	24-25	30-33	27-28
19	<i>Casata</i> CERVA MARTOLICA (*c. 1600)	36-52	14-18	24-26	20-22	16-17	18-19
20	<i>Casata</i> PROCULO STJEPAN son of BOŽO (c. 1654-1708)	7-8	4	16-17	32-33	-	-
21-22	<i>Casata</i> SORGO MARIN son of LUKA (*c. 1645)	36-52	38-51	36-37	16-18	5-8	10-14
21-22	<i>Casata</i> SORGO PETAR son of FRANO (c. 1663-1728)	23-25	11	38-41	34-35	14-15	15-17
23	<i>Casata</i> BONA LUKA son of FRANO (*c. 1630)	4-5	19-23	27-28	36-44	35	20-21
24	<i>Casata</i> GOZZE IVAN son of RADO (*c. 1655)	11-16	6-7	29-32	36-44	36-37	20-21
25-26	<i>Casata</i> GRADI JUNIJE son of MATO (1622-1667)	10	9-10	16-17	30-31	-	-
25-26	<i>Casata</i> SORGO JUNIJE son of LUKA (*c. 1615)	19-22	35	19-23	10-13	26-29	29-33
27	<i>Casata</i> ZAMAGNA-CERVA MARTOLICA son of PETAR (1720-1783)	36-52	32-34	6-8	10-13	26-29	-
28	<i>Casata</i> GOZZE LUKA son of NIKOLA (*c. 1635)	33-35	14-18	35	16-18	14-15	29-33




Rank- ing	<i>Casata</i>	Ranking in the period						
		1751- 1807	1751- 1760	1761- 1770	1771- 1780	1781- 1790	1791- 1800	1801- 1807
29	<i>Casata</i> GHETALDI MATO son of FRANO (*c. 1635)		9	12-13	29-32	34-35	34	29-33
30	<i>Casata</i> GOZZE LUKA son of VLADISLAV (*c. 1635)		36-52	31	14-15	36-44	26-29	8-9
31	<i>Casata</i> BONA IVAN son of IVAN NIKOLA (1714-1795)		31-32	24-27	19-23	24-25	30-33	-
32-33	<i>Casata</i> BOSDARI VLAHO son of MIHO (*c. 1635)		36-52	38-51	42-50	29	11	27-28
32-33	<i>Casata</i> GOZZE PAVAO son of VLADISLAV (*c. 1645)		36-52	36-37	19-23	20-22	21-23	-
34-36	<i>Casata</i> POZZA-SORGO LUCIJAN son of NIKOLA (1735-1813)		-	38-51	29-32	20-22	25	24-26
34-36	<i>Casata</i> GOZZE RADO son of VLADISLAV (*c. 1640)		30	38-51	42-50	26-28	24	15-17
34-36	<i>Casata</i> GOZZE NIKOLA son of PAVAO (1727-1799)		-	38-51	24-26	19	21-23	29-33
37	<i>Casata</i> ZAMAGNA SABO son of SERAFIN (*c. 1620)		6	28-29	42-50	36-44	36-37	-
38	<i>Casata</i> GOZZE NIKOLA son of LUKA (c. 1625-before 1671)		11-16	24-27	33-34	-	-	-
39-40	<i>Casata</i> BONA NIKOLA son of FRANO (*c. 1625)		11-16	19-23	-	-	-	-
39-40	<i>Casata</i> SORGO IVAN son of MARKO (c. 1664-1736)		27	24-27	29-32	-	-	-
41-42	<i>Casata</i> RESTI JUNIJE (*c. 1600)		36-52	32-34	42-50	36-44	21-23	22-23
41-42	<i>Casata</i> CERVA JUNIJE son of GABRIJEL (*c. 1635)		31-32	30	19-23	-	-	-
43	<i>Casata</i> NATALI JAKOV son of MATO (*c. 1600)		36-52	38-51	42-50	30-31	18-20	24-26
44-45	<i>Casata</i> BOBALI DAMJAN son of JAKOV (*c. 1655)		26	19-23	38-41	-	-	-
44-45	<i>Casata</i> GHETALDI-GONDOLA FRANO-AUGUSTIN son of MATO (1743-1798)		-	-	36-37	26-28	18-20	29-33
46	<i>Casata</i> GIORGI BONDA ORSAT son of MIHO (1730-1789)		36-52	38-51	33-34	36-44	38-40	8-9
47	<i>Casata</i> TUDISI STJEPAN son of VLAHO (*c. 1640)		7-8	-	-	-	-	-
48	<i>Casata</i> ZLATARIĆ MIHO son of DOMINIK (*c. 1605)		36-52	38-51	42-50	36-44	26-29	22-23
49	<i>Casata</i> BUĆA MATO son of MARIN (1682-1760)		11-16	-	-	-	-	-
50	<i>Casata</i> BONDA MARIN son of JERONIM (*c. 1620)		17-18	-	-	-	-	-
51	<i>Casata</i> PAULI ANDRIJA son of IVAN-PETAR (*c. 1630)		36-52	38-51	42-50	26-28	38-40	-
52-53	<i>Casata</i> RAGNINA JUNIJE son of SABO (1723-1772)		-	38-51	38-41	-	-	-
52-53	<i>Casata</i> MENZE JERONIM son of IVAN (*c. 1635)		33-35	38-51	42-50	36-44	-	-
54-56	<i>Casata</i> CLASCI IVAN son of STJEPAN (*c. 1620)		36-52	-	-	-	-	-
54-56	<i>Casata</i> BONA MARIN son of MARIN (c. 1662-1729)		36-52	38-51	-	-	-	-
54-56	<i>Casata</i> GONDOLA ŠIŠKO son of IVAN (*c. 1630)		36-52	38-51	42-50	36-44	41	-



Salamancanists



Sorbonnists - old nobility



Sorbonnists - new nobility

and a Sorbonnist, Mato Ghetaldi (1705-1776).<sup>86</sup> Although the discontented patricians stemmed from both coteries, the senators and office-holders from the Salamancanist group, who did not support the narrower oligarchic circle of the Sorgo brothers, represented the core. Bašić states that the leaders of the discontented group agreed but on one issue: to overthrow the oligarchy of the seven brothers. The Sorbonnists had no direct influence on the Senate and most of them sided with the discontented but, according to an anonymous Austrian account, a few of the Sorbonnists were in silent favour of the oligarchy, hoping that opportunism would bring them a step closer to senatorship. By the other faction they were labeled as Sorbonnist traitors.<sup>87</sup>

A tendency towards redistribution of power once again led to the petition for electoral and institutional reforms. During the session of November 9, 1762, Mato Gradi submitted the requests of the dissenters before the Senate: retreat of four Sorgo members, who were to remain on the Senate but without the right to vote; election by lot for the major offices in order to avoid bribe; and the observance of the age ordering criterion in the nomination of new senators. Although most of the patricians supported these requests, the ruling few on the Senate rejected them. No voting took place and the session was adjourned. The conflict escalated and in the next few days was marked by street riots. As the Major Council did not sit in November and thus failed to approve the magistrates for the following year, the government faced a crisis. After another confrontation on St. Sylvester of 1762, a provisional agreement was reached on the election of the rector and the January agenda of the Minor Council. A succession of futile negotiations took place over the next thirty days. The ruling minority resorted to a variety of compromising methods in order to gain support from the reluctant members, while an armed conflict was an alternative the dissenting group also had in mind. As the agreement had not yet been reached by the end of January 1763, the conflict intensified, and the government apparatus was paralyzed. A compromise was finally

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<sup>86</sup> Attached to Le Maire's letter from 1758 is the report of Paul Herculès on the political conflicts in the City. Herculès writes on the counter-French oriented Salamancanist elite on the Senate, opposed by a pro-French group consisting of the patricians from both coteries. As leading figures of the latter group he mentions Marin and Antun Sorgo, Rafo and Nikola Gozze, Mato Ghetaldi, and Nikola Bona. V. Jelavić, »O dubrovačko-franceskim odnosima«: p. 518.

<sup>87</sup> M. Novak Sambrailo, »Politika Dubrovčana«: p. 162. Anonym probably visited Dubrovnik in 1775. He is the first to mention the names *Salamanchi* and *Sorboni*, and in addition to the terms "the old" and "the new" uses them to describe the events from 1762/3, confirming thus their synonymity.

reached after the dissenters' threat to select the magistrates themselves, and the Major Council met on February 28, 1763.<sup>88</sup> Apart from the election of new senators, the ensuing meetings witnessed an acclamation of the new electoral system and the laws on procedure on Major Council and the Senate, drafted by three senators particularly assigned for the task.

In the main, the new regulations of March 5, 1763, fulfilled the dissidents' requests. Only three members of the same family branch were allowed to vote on the Senate and in case of the vote by special majority (*strettura*), merely two of them. In order to secure a fair and a proper proceeding of the elections, the new electoral system was based on sortition (*sortizione*), or a combination of sortition and ballot. For the sake of efficiency, in certain cases the reduction of the quorum on the Major Council was also decreed. For the same purpose, the Senate was the sole holder of the right to authentic interpretation of this law, by which the former constitutional responsibility of the *proveditori* (Guardians of Justice) seemed to have been ignored.<sup>89</sup>

The analysis of the *casate* ranking and their participation in the highest offices of the state (senators, rectors, members of the Minor Council, and judges) before and after the events of 1762/3 clearly shows that it was a conflict between the two strongest Salamancanist *casate* (Tables 12 and 13).

## 12. A compromise between the Salamancanists: persecution of the Sorbonnists

The conflict stirred by the oligarchy of the Sorgo brothers and Sabo Pozza was overcome by a new reform and a political compromise. The problem of

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<sup>88</sup> According to the accounts of Mato Bašić, Mato Pozza, a "person most wise and benevolent", played the main role in resolving the conflict, using his calming influence on the leader of the ruling oligarchy and his cousin, Sabo Pozza, as well as on his uncle Antun Sorgo, who, however, was under the strong influence of his brother-in-law, Frano Ragnina, a fierce enemy of the seven Sorgos. Pozza was supported by a cousin of his, a Salamancanist Nikola Bona, a most excellent lawyer, who tried to formulate a compromising legal proposition. Bona managed to talk the Sorgo brothers into accepting the proposed solution, the reconciliation being speeded up by the news of the outbreak of plague and the grouping of pasha's troops in Bosnia.

<sup>89</sup> *Liber Croceus*, c. 396. The most important office-holders of the Senate, judges, and *proveditori* (Guardians of Justice) were elect exclusively by sortition. Being a common source of conflict, the New Council (*collegio nuovo*) was abolished, and instead of it a similar body was introduced - Additional Council (*Giunta del collegio*) - consisting of 43 members who were to fill the vacant seats on the Senate according to the age order.

class rift, however, and the undermining effect it had on the Republic's institutional system were far too deep to be resolved through palliative measures.<sup>90</sup> The sortition system did, in fact, limit electoral manipulations, but the Senate still remained a closed body, and the members of the Minor council, judges, and rectors continued to be elected from the Senate's circle only.

Once again the compromise of 1763 provided conditions for the breaking of the short-term coalition of some Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists, marking the beginning of a new phase in the conflict between coteries, as confirmed by Prévost, French consul to Dubrovnik in 1770. During his absence in the first half of the year, a new conflict took place. As victims of Salamancanist oppression, a considerable number of young Sorbonnists fled to Italy, especially Ancona, or the Island of Korčula, which was under the Venetian rule. The membership of the Major Council dropped down by a quarter. The Salamancanists concealed the true reason underlying the Sorbonnist exodus, justifying their departure by their need for education abroad. All the twelve rectors came from the Salamancanist circle, which occurred only once in the latter half of the 18th century, in 1774. In Prévost's words, the citizens were distrustful and deeply concerned for the future of the state.<sup>91</sup>

An anonymous envoy in the service of Maria Theresia reports that after the death of Mato Gradi (1692-1771) the Salamancanist influence weakened. A worthy successor could not be found, although the young and able Miho Sorgo (1739-1796) was a serious candidate. The advocates of the former oligarchy came back on the scene and in the lead, but because of the biological drop, internal conflicts, and financial crisis, the Salamancanist influence was weakening.<sup>92</sup> The Salamancanist superiority, however, marked the last serious conflict in 1781, which was accompanied by street riots. The Sorbonnists overestimated their own strength and their own disunity led them to a defeat. The Salamancanist majority on the Senate organized an investigation and by a majority vote of 19 to 10 decided to punish severely the Sorbonnist dissenters: Brnjo Caboga (1739-1814) was sentenced to a one-year exile and a

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<sup>90</sup> In the closing chapter on "anarchy" in 1762/3, Mato Bašić critically remarks that the aristocratic order was destroyed by the patricians themselves, of which he had no intention to discuss further. In his opinion, all the social classes in the Republic should work together on the restoration of the former government system or some other most convenient form.

<sup>91</sup> V. Jelavić, »O dubrovačko-franceskim odnosima«: p. 543.

<sup>92</sup> M. Novak Sambrailo, »Politika Dubrovčana.«: p. 165.

two-year loss of patrician privileges; Maro Zamagna (1737-1808) was deprived of patrician privileges for a period of six months. The same sentence but with a different duration was passed onto Frano-Augustin Ghetaldi-Gondola (1743-1798) - two months, and Dživo Caboga (1743-1826) - a month. Frano-Jero Bona (1729-1802) was deprived of honours to a period of three years, and excluded from election to the Senate for a period of ten years. A Salaman-canist, Mato Pozza (1727-1802), was acquitted. According to the accounts of the noblewoman Kata Bassegli, the most notorious and extravagant among the Salaman-canists of the day was a certain Sekondo Buccia (1756-1807), whose intimidating actions against the Sorbonnists culminated in an episode in which Miho-Filip Bona (1757-1825), in fear of assault, barricaded himself inside his Gruž summer residence together with the body-guards.<sup>93</sup>

### 13. *The disintegration of the coteries*

The news on the rift within the Ragusan patriciate, permeated with an anachronistic policy of "blood" division, spread throughout Europe, received with a sneer in the Enlightenment circles. "Would you like me tell you of the current world, starting off with the Chinese emperor to the warring parties in Dubrovnik?", wrote Voltaire in his *Dialogue*.<sup>94</sup> But a perspective from the outside did not appease the political struggle. After the Salaman-canists' Pyrrhic victory, their hegemony started to show the first signs of weakening, the proof of which was the first election of the newly ennobled men to the highest offices: Andrija Pauli (1697-1783) was elected senator in 1783, and even rector in 1786, while Miho Pauli (1716-1792) was elected member of the Minor Council.<sup>95</sup>

The weakening of the Salaman-canists' political position proceeded without any particular act of pressure on the Sorbonnist behalf. Namely, in 1783 it became apparent that the brothers Lukša (1734-1789) and Miho Sorgo (1739-1796) consorted with the Austrian court. Their intent may have been to use Austria in reinforcing their own position in the City, under certain concessions. A small patrician group flocked around the brothers with an aim to

<sup>93</sup> S. Razzi, *La storia di Ragusa*: p. 268; Ž. Muljačić, »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: pp. 33-34.

<sup>94</sup> Ivan Stojanović, *Povijest Dubrovačke Republike*. Dubrovnik, 1903: p. 190; On Enlightenment perception of the Ragusan government see also: Žarko Muljačić, »Tko je dubrovački Montesquieu?«. *Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Zagrebu* 3 (1955): pp. 183-191.

<sup>95</sup> *Specchio*, 18th c., f. 207v, 42 (SAD).

carry out certain political reforms based on the ideas of the Enlightenment. They also counted on the Sorbonnist support. Ivo Natali characterized their policy as an attempt to introduce tyranny, but the fate of Lukša Sorgo and the activity of his brother Miho show that Natali's criticism was far too harsh.<sup>96</sup> Due to strong resistance within the ranks of the patricians, the brothers faced a failure. Further political division of the Salamancanists seemed inevitable. The followers of the Sorgo brothers, gathered around the learned Tomo Bassegli and Džono Resti, were bending their position towards the Sorbonnists, ignoring the "blood" criterion.<sup>97</sup> The spirit of Enlightenment, conflicts in the Mediterranean area, and the revolutionary movements in France mirrored onto the political conditions in Dubrovnik. New forms of political coalition emerge and the "blood" criterion no longer features as the matrix of the political conflict, although its biological substance remains relevant until the fall of the Republic.

The scandal with the Sorgo brothers coincided with the new electoral and institutional reforms at the beginning of 1783. The weakened Salamancanists tried to convince the legislative body to revive the old electoral system by means of chambers for all the highest offices.<sup>98</sup> Election by ballots was abandoned with proclaiming "the restoration of the original order", and the Major Council restored its electoral authority. *Giunta del Collegio* (Additional Collegium) was also abolished, and new senators were selected the old way. But the old electoral procedure could not bring back the institutional stabil-

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<sup>96</sup> It is more likely that the Sorgo brothers and their affiliates advocated for moderate Enlightenment reforms and "patriotism" which implied the rejection of agnatic coteries when public affairs were at stake. Although the views of the Sorgo brothers were permeated with Enlightenment thought, the evidence on their political activity in that direction is sparse. The diary entries of Lukša Sorgo during his Vienna days in 1780/1 (*Memoriae*, vol. 145, SAD), do not reveal any particular political goals, apart from the usual diplomatic practice aimed at the protection of the Ragusan interests. A failure in the political life marked the retirement and a tragic end of Lukša Sorgo. In 1785 Miho Sorgo left for Italy. Upon his return to Dubrovnik, he devoted himself entirely to literary and cultural work. Cf. Ž. Muljačić, »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: p. 32; Žarko Muljačić, »Dva priloga povijesti dubrovačkih akademija«. *Radovi Instituta JAZU u Zadru* 4-5 (1959): pp. 319-340.

<sup>97</sup> The correspondence of Sorgo's nephew, Tomo Bassegli, with his mother Kata confirms the existence of the rift among the weakened Salamancanists in the early 1790s. Tomo's marriage with a foreigner in 1786 and the complaints concerning his diplomatic service with Leopold II contributed to the Bassegli's departure from the extreme Salamancanists. Ž. Muljačić, »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: pp. 36-38.

<sup>98</sup> *Liber Croceus*, c. 425. On this occasion, too, the Senate's exclusive right to interpretation was confirmed.

ity and the political unity of long before. Moreover, the Senate continued to function as a closed body due to the class rift and numerous factions within the coterie themselves. The once practiced principle of the senatorial elections, which implied a greater number of candidates and faster circulation of the membership, was not restored. In practice, however, it did not make much difference as to how the leading offices were filled (sortition or election), because the number of the patricians who were age-eligible to enter the Senate and hold the most important offices fell well below the necessary pool (Table 10).

Although by the mid-1770s the Sorbonnists already outnumbered their opponents and retained this position in the 1790s, the entire patriciate was subject to a negative demographic trend, which proved to have a most soothing effect upon their antagonism. The electoral procedure from 1783 was soon abandoned, and the law of 1791 reintroduced lot, i. e. a combination of sortition and election for all offices. This was the last in line of the numerous electoral changes, which, with modest results, aimed to determine the balance of power among the patriciate. The sortition secured the Salamancanist minority to remain on certain posts. Only a third of the votes in the Major Council was necessary for the confirmation of the current senators, while the new ones were selected in accordance with the age ordering only, requiring a mere quarter of the votes of the same body. This regulation was of vital importance because of the biological implosion of the ruling class.<sup>99</sup> The Senate had the exclusive right to the interpretation of these regulations.<sup>100</sup> The number of active members of the Major Council was experiencing a constant decline and fell below the number of 45 senator's posts, so that the elections became a sheer formality, especially having in mind the age criterion. Thus in the electoral sense, the Major Council became practically redundant.

Under the pressure of events, the agnatically-based political struggle for the dominant position on the Senate began to lack pace, and virtually died out in the last fifteen years of the Republic. It was replaced by new coalition forms, which, similar to the rift two centuries earlier, had their roots in foreign policy issues and the affiliation of certain patrician groups towards par-

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<sup>99</sup> Strict endogamy was still practised by the Ragusan elite despite the crisis. On June 17, 1791, the Major Council passed a law which allowed betrothal and marriage between spouses of the first degree of consanguinity with the permission of the Holy See. *Liber Croceus*, c. 441.

<sup>100</sup> *Liber Croceus*, c. 440.



ticular European powers. Although the ancient “blood” distinction was still in effect, dynamic processes in Europe, accompanied by post-revolutionary wars and Napoleon’s campaigns had a strong influence upon the shaping of new political groups within the Ragusan patriciate. Therefore, by the end of the 18th century a Francophile, Austrophile, and Russophile factions made their appearance. In addition to these, conditionally characterized by their foreign orientation, which, at the dawn of the 19th century, Mato Pozza termed as *Monarchici*, there were also *Marittimi* and *Oligarchici*.<sup>101</sup> Apparently, this was a new political pattern among the patriciate, tending to mirror their position in the economic stratification in course.<sup>102</sup> Each group had both Salamancanist and Sorbonnist partisans, proving that the agnatic division had lost its political significance. The group Pozza refers to as *Monarchici* bore hardly any specific ideological features, and their political affiliation to the regimes of the foreign states was completely vague. Although Pozza classified them under a common group of royalists, there is ground to believe that their support was more of a traditional tendency towards one of the great powers, aimed at reinforcing the international position of the Republic of Dubrovnik. The other two groups, however, did feature certain ideological attributes. *Marittimi* most likely represented the business-minded liberal nobility which invested into shipping industry. This group tended to coordinate the state administration with its own business profit. The development of shipping industry in the late 18th century contributed to the growing number of ship and cargo share- and co-share-holders (*karatisti*) among the patricians. Thus the *Marittimi* were becoming more influential, sharing the same interests with wealthy citizens who owned most of the commercial fleet and who pioneered the new development of the maritime commerce. As most of the Republic’s budget came from shipping, a group of impoverished nobles to whom the sinecures represented a valuable source of income, crossed the class barrier and tended to cooperate with the citizens. A group referred to as *Oligarchici* probably consisted of the conservative members of the landed aristocracy, which rejected the necessary reforms of the antiquated class system. Economically inferior, these *entratisti* contributed considerably to the maintenance of the feudal real estate, and in order to hinder the social changes,

<sup>101</sup> Vid V. Vukasović, »Bilješke o strankama u Dubrovniku početkom XIX. vijeka«. *Srđ* 7/1-5 (1908): pp. 108-110.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Stjepan Ćosić, *Dubrovnik nakon pada Republike*. Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne zna-  
nosti HAZU, 1999: pp. 18-19.



they supported the mercantile laws and other restrictive legislations concerning shipping and commerce. Seven Sorbonnists were among them, too, testifying once again to the fact that their social attitudes were not *differentia specifica* with regard to the Salamancanists (Table 14).

Table 14. New political groupings among the Ragusan patriciate preceding the fall of the Republic of Dubrovnik

Political grouping (account of Mato Pozza, after 1803)		Salamancanists		Sorbonnists	
		Num- ber	Persons	Num- ber	Persons
<i>Marittimi</i>		3	Mato son of Lucijan Pozza, Nikola son of Sabo Gradi, Miho son of Sabo Gradi	6	canon Saraca, Nikola Saraca, Lucijan Gozze, Petar, Mart and Vlaho son of Marin Bona
<i>Oligarhici</i>		12	Luco son of Nikola, Nikola and Marin, sons of Mato, Nikola son of Nikola Pozza, Sabo son of Miho, Miho and Luco, sons of Sabo, Miho and Niko, sons of Luko Giorgi, Marin son of Luko Bonda, Orsat Ragnina-Buzdo, Baldo Gozze	7	Mato, Vladislav and Marin Sorgo, Ivan Gozze-Tabakin, Karlo and Ivan Natali, Ivan Cerva
<i>Monarchici</i>	Francophile	5	Antun son of Luko Sorgo, Tomo Bassegli, Orsat son of Luko Bonda, Rado Gozze, Sekondo Bucchia	5	Ivan and Martol Bosdari, Ivan son of Petar Sorgo, Mato and Ivan Ghetaldi
	Austrophile	3	Nikola son of Luco Pozza, Miho Bonda, Orsat Ragnina-Čikuta	4	Bernard, Ivan, Antun and Vlaho Caboga
	Russophile	2	Nikola and Šiško Gradi	6	Jero and Jakov Natali, Marin, Frano, Miho and Luka Zamagna
	Anglophile	1	Džono Resti		
Francophiles (report of the Austrian consul Timoni of May 18, 1809)		8	1 <sup>st</sup> class: Nikola son of Luco and Nikola son of Nikola Pozza, Savin and Marinica Giorgi, Antun Sorgo 2 <sup>nd</sup> class: Frano Gozze, Palo Gozze 3 <sup>rd</sup> class: Vladislav son of Palo Gozze	5	1 <sup>st</sup> class: Ivan Bosdari, Jakov Natali, D. Antun Zlatarić 2 <sup>nd</sup> class: Luko son of Miho Bona, Antun Caboga

Source: Vid Vuletić-Vukasović, »Bilješke o strankama u Dubrovniku početkom XIX. vijeku.« *Srđ* 7/1-5 (1908): pp. 108-110; Lujo Vojnović, *Pad Dubrovnika. Knjiga druga (1807.-1815.)*. Zagreb, 1908: pp. 15-418.

When the Sorbonnists were finally in position to take the lead, the coteries disintegrated. The entire 18th century was marked by the Salamancanist superiority, the Sorbonnists being completely neutralized and politically disunited. The history of this conflict shows the Salamancanists' profound determination to dominate. When the Salamancanists were numerically superior, they ruled by the power of vote. When their numerical superiority started to decline, they secured the continuity of their rule through adapting the electoral system to their needs. Time-consuming and weary, the struggle for domination over the Sorbonnists led the Salamancanists to their own end as well. When even the institutional measures became insufficient to Salamancanists for securing political domination, the Sorbonnists were far too impotent to take advantage of the situation. The Salamancanist majority maintained its superior position only because the "rival party had more fools than the former", so bluntly put by Kata Bassegli, a contemporary Salamancanist observer.<sup>103</sup> With the dawn of the 19th century, the two patrician coteries crumbled away together with their state.

The disintegration of the coteries equally reflected on the reproductive level. With the fall of the Republic of Dubrovnik the still-living Salamancanists and Sorbonnists tend to abandon endogamy by marrying outsiders of foreign or common origin. The last of the "pure-blooded" patricians, the paragon of patriciate's identity, was Nikola (Nikša) Gradi (1825-1894).<sup>104</sup>

#### *14. Patrician patriotism: the last remaining relic of class unity*

The new ideas of the Enlightenment and rationalism could not stir the social and governmental model of the Republic of Dubrovnik, which, until the very last moment, remained deeply entrenched in the frames of the *ancien regime*. But the exhausting patrician conflict deformed the government pattern, causing delays in decision-making and reluctance in their implementation. Apart from Napoleon's military campaign, that was the main reason underlying the fall of the Republic. Despite the fact that in the last decades of the independence the patrician disintegration, manifested in a variety of forms, reached a climax, the Ragusan patriciate never gave up on the good old republican patriotism. None of the agnatically-based political or

<sup>103</sup> Ž. Mušajić, »O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: p. 36.

<sup>104</sup> Milan Rešetar, »Posljednji dubrovački vlastelin«, *Dubrovački list* 2/25 (1925): pp. 1-2.

pressure groups of the patriciate under inquiry ever worked against the Republic's independence, or conversely, to the benefit of its subjugation by any of the great European powers. The conflicts among the patricians most commonly developed from the agnatic or personal disagreements on international issues and their assessment of the potential political allies of the Republic. Occasional ideological differences between them were merely a reflection of the external political affairs. Ambitions for internal changes on the institutional and social level, influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment, translated into propositions for moderate reforms and a mild shift along the mainstream of the current system. As in the case of the brothers Sörgo and Tomo Basseglj, these efforts got caught in the closely-knit network of the agnatic and political interests.<sup>105</sup> The divisive pattern penetrated into all the segments of the antiquated institutional apparatus of the Republic, which, once dichotomized, virtually collapsed. In practice, the rift was conceived as a prime political fact, because of which every initiative directed towards patrician unity and redistribution of power was untenable. Political disunity reflected on the foreign policy as well. The Great Conspiracy started with the most radical effort ever to shift the focus of foreign policy. It resulted, however, in an inner-class agnatic conflict, the political contents of the Conspiracy featuring as a mere setting. The policy of confrontation gave way to consensus only in the time periods of the most direct threat to the Republic.

Ragusan patriotism remained the only identity feature all the patricians shared. Its contents, however, cannot compare to the feeling of local patriotism shared by part of the citizenry and rural population. Patrician patriotism was based on the idea of corporate government, with the Republic as a warrant of their aristocratic status. In the form of identity based on tradition, patrician patriotism survived even the most challenging political crises Dubrovnik experienced after French occupation and in the first years of the Austrian rule. Irrespective of the agnatic and political identity, most patricians were ready to make supreme sacrifice for the restoration of the state. Attempts to consolidate the patriciate marked the period of French occupation, when, by the end of 1813, under the leadership of Vlaho Caboga, the people of Dubrovnik rose against the French. According to Ivo Natali's own

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<sup>105</sup> Cfr. Ivo Banac, »Tomo Baselj i pitanje dubrovačkih "Frančeza"«, in: Miljenko Foretić (ed.), *Dubrovačka Republika i Francuska revolucija*. Dubrovnik: Matica hrvatska, 1996: pp. 61-70.

testimony, the patriciate was exclusively guided by the idea of restoring the old regime and ignored the political reforms aimed at mitigating class differences.<sup>106</sup> A breath of fresh patriotism remained but a class category, an emotional relic of a long lost political harmony and a last-ditch attempt of the patriciate to conserve its identity after their state had become a thing of the past.

### 15. Conclusion

As the process under study covers a wide chronological as well as social range, many aspects of the division of the Ragusan patriciate have remained beyond the scope of this article. Our primary aim was to identify the problem, provide an analysis of the most crucial moments and reconstruct its development in outline. Further research should be based on a most accurate reconstruction of agnatic ties between the Ragusan patricians from the end of the sixteenth century to the period of aggregation in the 1660s. These results should be compared to the representation of certain families and *casate* in the inner circle of government. Future research should also explain the origin and the symbolic meaning of the terms Salamancanists (*salamankezi*) and Sorbonnists (*sorbonezi*) and should further analyze their shifting political and general positions over a century and a half. Also, this article has not highlighted the function of the Jesuits who apparently played a significant role in the division of the Ragusan patriciate. A welcome light should be shed on the political activity of some distinguished noble heads from both factions, etc.

The principle of consensus, typical for the acting of Ragusan patrician body, was incorporated into the laws and institutions of the Republic. This principle, however, melted away with the increasing rivalries between the noble families, leading eventually to a serious conflict between patrician factions and a change in the political pattern. The roots of the division should be sought in the different political positions towards the protagonists of the Great Conspiracy of 1611/12.

Banished after an alleged love affair, Jakov Giorgi and Jakov Resti plotted with Charles Emmanuel I, duke of Savoy, against the Ottomans in an attempt to involve the Republic of Dubrovnik as well. By September 1612

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<sup>106</sup> S. Ćosić, *Dubrovnik nakon pada Republike*: pp. 99-116.

they were arrested, and awaited the capital execution. The sentence, however, caused quite a stir among the Ragusan patricians. What followed was a theatrical display of agnatic solidarity. Instead of death, the sentenced “counter-Ottoman” oriented conspirators won a political victory over the pragmatic faction of the “Republican loyalists”. Not only was their punishment mitigated but the conspirators were even encouraged to escape. This incident polarized the nobility, giving way to a rift between the conspirators’ kin and the prosecutors, who eventually exchanged roles: the traitors were acclaimed heroes and the prosecutors labeled as hangmen. Many patricians, initially neutral, were to join the party which booked a social victory. A strong agnatic network gathered around the conspirators, and formed a faction called “the Salamancanists”, becoming fully determined after the aggregation of the new nobility. This faction played a dominant role in Dubrovnik in the forthcoming century and a half, while an inferior position was reserved for the so-called “Sorbonnists”, with whom the new nobility later coalesced.

Conflicts between the two closed groups continued well into the eighteenth century. Their unscrupulous struggle for power reshaped the long-established model of political behaviour. The prior political stability was based on the traditional electoral procedure and balance among the highest government bodies, but from the latter half of the eighteenth century the antiquated institutional pattern could no longer meet the needs of the new political reality which was marked by intense internal conflicts. Although they played the major role in the new framework, the Salamancanists were doomed to extinction because of their uncommonly strict endogamous practice. Each mesalliance directly undermined their group and thus aided their opponents. By the 1770s the Sorbonnists outnumbered them. Despite this shift in number, the Salamancanists still managed to neutralize the Sorbonnists by destroying their political unity. Being over-represented on the major government bodies, the Salamancanists ruled by the power of vote. Once their majority was brought into question, they resorted to the reform of the electoral system and thus maintained power. The long-drawn-out struggle for power with the Sorbonnists led the Salamancanist faction to its own end. When the latter were no longer able to secure the leading position through institutional devices, the Sorbonnists were far too impotent to stand at the wheel. With the dawn of the nineteenth century the exhausted patrician factions crumbled away together with their state.